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The juvenile court has historically been a hybrid
institution in terms of its purpose and procedures,
incorporating aspects of both the civil and criminal court
systems.' In the late nineteenth century, the founders of the
first juvenile courts in the United States were motivated by
a desire to provide a forum-separate and discrete from
that of adult criminal defendants-for the adjudication and
disposition of child and adolescent offenders.2 The initial
result was an informal system emphasizing the
rehabilitation and remediation of wayward youth, with little
focus on the court's fact-finding role vis-A-vis the alleged
criminal offense and even less consideration given to the
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1. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 541 (1971) ("Little, indeed, is to
be gained by any attempt simplistically to call the juvenile court proceeding
either 'civil' or 'criminal.").
2. See DAVID S. TANENHAUS, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN THE MAKING 4-22 (2004)
(describing the efforts of women reformers and philanthropists during the 1880s
and 1890s to establish a separate justice system in Chicago for children accused
of committing crimes); see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15 (1967) ("The early
reformers were appalled by adult procedures and penalties, and by the fact that
children could be given long prison sentences and mixed in jails with hardened
criminals.").
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rights of the accused.' As the decades passed and the
juvenile court became increasingly punitive, child advocates
challenged the informality of delinquency proceedings, and
critical due process rights were ultimately granted to young
offenders.4 In the 1960s and early 1970s, the United States
Supreme Court held in a trio of foundational cases that
juveniles have basic due process rights in delinquency
proceedings5 and before transfer from juvenile to adult
criminal court.6 Certain rights-including trial by jury-
were not extended to juveniles,7 however, premised on the
contention that the unique and beneficial aspects of juvenile
court would be compromised if all the formalities of the
criminal system were "superimposed" upon it.' As the
juvenile court system has expanded and the realities of
limited resources and inadequate staffing have become
apparent, the concern expressed by Justice Fortas in 1966
3. See Commonwealth v. Fisher, 62 A. 198, 200 (Pa. 1905) ('To save a child
from becoming a criminal, ... the Legislature surely may provide for the
salvation of such a child, if its parents or guardian be unable or unwilling to do
so, by bringing it into one of the courts of the state without any process at all, for
the purpose of subjecting it to the state's guardianship and protection.")
(emphasis added); Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L. REV. 104,
109-10, 119-20 (1909) ("The problem for determination by the judge is not, Has
this boy or girl committed a specific wrong, but What is he, how has he become
what he is, and what had best be done in his interest and in the interest of the
state to save him from a downward career.").
4. Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and
the Regulation of Youth Crime,THE FUTURE OF CHILD., Fall 2008, at 15, 17.
5. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (applying the standard of proof of
"beyond a reasonable doubt" to juvenile delinquency cases); In re Gault, 387 U.S.
at 41, 55, 57 (holding that due process rights, such as the right to counsel, the
privilege against self-incrimination, and the opportunity for cross-examination
of witnesses, apply to juvenile delinquency proceedings).
6. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553-54 (1966) (holding that
juveniles have a due process right to a hearing, to effective assistance of counsel,
and to a statement of reasons prior to being transferred from juvenile court to
adult criminal court).
7. The term "juvenile" as used here refers to those young offenders who are
under the jurisdiction of their state's juvenile delinquency court. The majority of
states in the United States cap juvenile court jurisdiction at age eighteen or
seventeen, while three currently end it at age sixteen. Tamar R. Birckhead,
North Carolina, Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, and the Resistance to Reform, 86
N.C. L. REV. 1443, 1445 & nn.1 & 3 (2008).
8. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 551 (1971).
2009] JUSTICE FOR JUVENILES 1449
that juveniles were receiving "the worst of both worlds"
continues to resonate.9
The debate over how to weigh the potential benefits of
juvenile court against the risks associated with the denial of
due process rights has animated critical analysis of the
juvenile justice system for the past forty years.1" Some
courts and commentators have applied the contractual
concept of quid pro quo ("something for something")" when
deciding whether a particular procedural protection, such as
the right to a jury trial, is constitutionally mandated for
juvenile offenders. 2 It is suggested in these opinions-
usually in explicit terms-that with the granting of each
"new" right to juveniles, there is less of a need for a
separate children's court.13 Alternatively, courts have
9. Kent, 383 U.S. at 555-56 (stating that because juvenile court proceedings
are neither wholly civil nor criminal in nature, a juvenile "gets neither the
protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative
treatment postulated for children").
10. See, e.g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263 (1984) ("We have tried,
therefore, to strike a balance-to respect the 'informality' and 'flexibility' that
characterize juvenile proceedings, . . .and yet to ensure that such proceedings
comport with the 'fundamental fairness' demanded by the Due Process Clause.")
(citations omitted); In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 366 (finding that application of
the reasonable doubt standard to juvenile adjudications will not "risk
destruction of beneficial aspects of the juvenile process'). But see In re Gault,
387 U.S. at 21 ("It is claimed that juveniles obtain benefits from the special
procedures applicable to them which more than offset the disadvantages of
denial of the substance of normal due process. As we shall discuss, the
observance of due process standards, intelligently and not ruthlessly
administered, will not compel the States to abandon or displace any of the
substantive benefits of the juvenile process.").
11. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1282 (8th ed. 2004) ("[Quid pro quo means a]n
action or thing that is exchanged for another action or thing of more of less
equal value....').
12. See, e.g., Doe v. McFaul, 599 F. Supp. 1421, 1428 (N.D. Ohio 1984)
("[J]udges agree that a juvenile court system must maintain a quid pro quo
under which juveniles who are deprived of due process rights" receive
"rehabilitative and individual treatment" in exchange.); Osorio v. Rios, 429 F.
Supp. 570, 574 (D.P.R. 1976) ("[T]he quid pro quo for juvenile procedures is not.
• .[only] 'rehabilitation'.. . [but also] escap[ing] legal disabilities imposed upon
adult offenders, such as a criminal record.').
13. See, e.g., McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545 ("There is a possibility, at least, that
the jury trial, if required as a matter of constitutional precept, will remake the
juvenile proceeding into a fully adversary process and will put an effective end
to what has been the idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal protective
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denied specific procedural protections to juveniles when
convinced that young offenders have received rehabilitative
services, and not punitive treatment, in return.14 Other
courts have moved away from a strict rendering of quid pro
quo and toward a more flexible balancing of competing
interests when determining whether to provide a particular
procedural right to juveniles; 5 in these cases, the decision
often hinges upon the court's sense of what is required to
achieve a "fundamentally fair" result. 16 The question rarely
proceeding."); see also United States v. Edward J., 224 F.3d 1216, 1223 (10th
Cir. 2000) (relying on McKeiver to deny juveniles the right to a public trial, as it
would bring "the clamor of the adversary system"); People v. Taylor, 850 N.E.2d
134, 142 (111. 2006) (holding that because juveniles do not have the right to a
jury trial, juvenile adjudications cannot be deemed "criminal felony
convictions').
14. See, e.g., In re C.B., 708 So. 2d 391, 397 (La. 1998) ("[T]here has been
recognized in the juvenile system a 'quid pro quo' under which juveniles who are
placed in adult facilities without the safeguards of due process that are enjoyed
by adults will receive in return rehabilitative treatment rather than mere
punitive incarceration.') (citations omitted).
15. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 365-66 ( "[C]ivil labels and good
intentions do not themselves obviate the need for criminal due process
safeguards in juvenile courts.... .'); see also Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172,
1181 (1st Cir. 1983) (remanding case to determine whether isolation of juveniles
at a correctional institution was "reasonably related to a legitimate government
objective, or simply adds to the punishment already imposed by incarceration');
In re Jason C., 767 A.2d 710, 718-19 (Conn. 2001) (using a balancing approach
to conclude that the unique character of juvenile court will not be damaged by
requiring that a juvenile be advised of the possibility of commitment extension
before a plea is accepted); In re Steven G., 556 A.2d 131, 134-35 (Conn. 1989)
(concluding that the lower court did not err in applying a "fundamental fairness"
analysis when upholding the trial court's decision to allow additional charges to
be brought midtrial against a juvenile); Irene Merker Rosenberg, The
Constitutional Rights of Children Charged with Crime: Proposal for a Return to
the Not So Distant Past, 27 UCLA L. REV. 656, 695-96 (19-80) (describing the
way in which the U.S. Supreme Court has "balanc[ed] the values served by the
[D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause and the Bill of Rights against the values achieved by an
efficient system for apprehension and correction of children accused of crime').
16. See, e.g., Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554, 561 (1966) (resting its
decision that juveniles have a due process right to a hearing before transfer
from juvenile to adult criminal court on abstract notions of "justice"); see also
Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 540-41 (1975) (relying on concepts of "fundamental
fairness" to hold that the 5th Amendment prohibition against double jeopardy
applies to juvenile court adjudications); In re Kevin S., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 178, 187-
88, 197 (Ct. App. 2003) (relying on "the essentials of due process and fair
treatment" to hold that juveniles have a right to appointed counsel on appeal of
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posed, however, is whether weighing rehabilitative against
punitive theories of delinquency court is the proper
calculus. 7 Will certain procedural protections "spell the
doom"" of the juvenile court system, or should the analysis
be focused on completely different factors?
In 2008, the Kansas Supreme Court held that juveniles
have a constitutional right to a jury trial, 9 bringing the
total number of states that either provide jury trials to
juveniles by right or allow them under limited
circumstances to twenty.2" In re L.M. was premised on the
delinquency adjudications); State v. Brown, 879 So. 2d 1276, 1289 (La. 2004)
(holding, based on notions of "fundamental fairness," that prior adjudications of
delinquency cannot be used to enhance defendant's sentence where adjudication
was rendered without the right to trial by jury).
17. See Franklin E. Zimring, The Common Thread: Diversion in the
Jurisprudence of Juvenile Courts, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 142, 144-
50 (Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds., 2002) (describing an informal and
rehabilitative juvenile court as one in which standards of proof and defense
lawyers are considered "a major drawback to identifying children in need and
providing them with help" while a "diversionary" theory of juvenile justice
perceives no conflict between appropriate due process protections that shield
young offenders from the gratuitous harms and destructive impact of the
criminal courts and achieving the beneficial functions of the juvenile system).
18. In re C.B., 708 So. 2d at 398.
19. In re L.M., 186 P.3d 164, 170 (Kan. 2008).
20. Linda A. Szymanski, Juvenile Delinquents' Right to a Jury Trial (2007
Update), NCJJ SNAPSHOT (Nat'l Ctr. for Juvenile Justice, Pittsburgh, Pa.), Feb.
2008 (stating that thirty states plus the District of Columbia have statutory or
case law that denies juveniles the right to a jury trial, while the remaining
states either allow for it by right for delinquency adjudications cr provide jury
trials for juveniles under limited circumstances). During the past fifteen years,
several states-including Louisiana, Oregon, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and
Wisconsin-have proposed, but not enacted, legislation that would have
permitted or required jury trials for juveniles. Id. With the 2008 Kansas court
decision affording juveniles the right to trial by jury, ten states now provide for
jury trials at adjudication. See generally OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 19; ALASKA STAT.
§ 47.12.110(a) (2008); MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 119, § 56(c) (2008); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 41-5-1502 (2007); N.M. STAT. § 32A-2-16 (2006); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 54.03(b)(6) (Vernon 2008); W. VA. CODE § 49-5-6 (2007); WyO. STAT. ANN. § 14-
6-223 (2009); MCR 3.911(a); In re L.M., 186 P.3d at 170. Ten states allow jury
trials for juveniles only under limited special circumstances. See generally ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-27-325(a)(1)(B) (2008) ("If a juvenile is designated an extended
juvenile jurisdiction offender, the juvenile shall have a right to a jury trial at the
adjudication."); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-107(1) (2008) (stating that a jury trial
may be demanded when a juvenile is alleged to be an aggravated juvenile
offender or alleged to have committed a crime of violence); CONN. GEN. STAT.
1452 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57
contention that punitive legislation passed during the
previous quarter-century had eroded the distinctions
between the juvenile and criminal justice systems and
thereby compromised the juvenile court's "benevolent,
parens patriae character."'" After closely comparing the
language and purpose of the state's juvenile and criminal
codes, the Kansas court concluded that because of the
similarities between the two systems, young offenders must
be afforded the protection of trial by jury under the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments.22  While In re L.M. is
§ 46b-133c (2009) (stating that if juvenile is a "serious juvenile repeat offender,"
having been charged with committing a felony after the age of fourteen, the
juvenile has a right to a jury trial); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-509(1) (2006) (stating
that juveniles under the age of eighteen shall be "ordered by the court to be held
for adult criminal proceedings" if alleged to have committed any of the
enumerated offenses, and "[a]ny juvenile proceeded against pursuant to this
section shall be accorded all constitutional rights, including bail and trial by
jury," and all other procedural safeguards that are provided to adult
defendants); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-810(3) (2007) ("A minor who is subject of
an extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecution has the right to trial by jury.');
MINN. STAT. § 260B.163 (2007) ("[Hearings on any matter shall be without a
jury and may be conducted in an informal manner, except that a child who is
prosecuted as an extended jurisdiction juvenile has the right to a jury trial on
the issue of guilt."); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:19 (2008) ("Any minor
sentenced after a contested adjudicatory hearing to an order of conditional
release extending beyond the juvenile's age of majority or suspended, deferred,
or imposed incarceration at an adult correctional facility may, after the
disposition is issued, request a de novo trial before a jury.'); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2152.67 (West 2005) (stating that jury trials are available for juveniles
only upon the judge's own motion); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 14-1-7.2, -7.3 (Supp. 2008)
(stating that after a certification hearing, juveniles sixteen and older who have
been found delinquent for having committed two offenses after the age of
sixteen shall be afforded the right to a jury trial); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-296(C)
(2009) (stating that upon appeal of a delinquency finding, the juvenile,
prosecutor, or judge may request a jury trial).
21. In re L.M., 186 P.3d at 170. The Latin term "parens patriae" literally
translates as "parent of his or her country" but refers in this context to the
ability of the state to stand in as a "surrogate parent" to juveniles without
requiring the due process protections afforded to adults. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 11, at 1144-45; see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16
(1967) ('The Latin phrase proved to be a great help to those who sought to
rationalize the exclusion of juveniles from the constitutional scheme; but its
meaning is murky and its historic credentials are of dubious relevance.").
22. In re L.M., 186 P.3d at 170 ("[Bjecause the juvenile justice system is now
patterned after the adult criminal system, we conclude that the changes have
superseded the ... Courts' reasoning and those decisions are no longer binding
precedent for us to follow.').
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considered by many juvenile justice advocates to have been
a clear victory for young offenders,23 its holding may also be
seen as perpetuating the concept of quid pro quo, in which
the rehabilitative ideal of juvenile court is directly
juxtaposed against the due process protections provided to
adults under the adversarial model.24 Yet, instead of
concluding that the jury trial right would compromise the
beneficial nature of juvenile court, the Kansas Supreme
Court found that there was so little left to distinguish the
juvenile system from the adult system that this right could
no longer be denied.25 In this way, the decision may also be
seen as taking a step toward the more radical notion that
because of its shortcomings and ineffectiveness, the juvenile
court system should be abolished as a separate procedural
entity and replaced with a criminal court for minors."
23. See, e.g., David Klepper & Diane Carroll, Ruling: Juveniles Can Have
Jury Trials, WICHITA EAGLE, June 21, 2008, at 1A (stating that Kansas City
attorneys who represent juvenile offenders welcomed the ruling, and quoting a
local district court judge who regularly granted juveniles jury trials as calling
the ruling "a big deal"); see also Mike Belt, Court: Juveniles Have Right to Jury
Trial, LAWRENCE J.-WORLD (Kan.), June 21, 2008, at Al (reporting optimism by
defense attorneys that juries will be more sympathetic than judges, and fears by
prosecutors that processing time and costs will "double, if not triple'); Steve Fry,
County Court Hears First Juvenile Trial, TOPEKA CAPITAL -J., Oct. 28, 2008, at
1A (reporting concern regarding the increased numbers of juvenile jury trials);
David Klepper, Major Changes Predicted in Juvenile Justice System, KAN. CITY
STAR (Mo.), Sept. 28, 2008, at B1 (reporting that because of efforts in Missouri to
treat juveniles more like adults, the Kansas decision is being closely
considered); Jon Ruhlen, Thus Far, Juvenile Jury Law a Minor Burden, THE
HUTCHINSON NEWS (Kan.), Jan. 25, 2009, at Al (stating that the impact of the
Kansas ruling is not yet known, as the area is "uncharted territory").
24. See supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text.
25. In re L.M, 186 P.3d at 170.
26. See, e.g., Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and
Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69
N.C. L. REV. 1083 (1991) (arguing for merging the juvenile and adult court
systems to provide more effective procedural safeguards for juvenile offenders);
Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal
Responsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68, 96-102,
113-21 (1997) (arguing for a unified criminal justice system that provides young
offenders full due process protections as well as sentence reductions based on
their youth); see also Charles E. Springer, Rehabilitating the Juvenile Court, 5
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 397, 411-19 (1990) (arguing that because
juvenile court treats children like criminals and vice versa, the juvenile court
BUFFALO LAWREVIEW
This Article critically examines the ways in which
courts have determined whether juveniles should be
granted certain procedural rights, and it argues that rather
than subscribe to the wooden concept of quid pro quo or
utilize a subjective balancing approach, courts should allow
empirical research evaluating adolescents' appraisals of the
fairness of a decision-making process-also known as
procedural justice-to inform the decision.27 Part I analyzes
United States Supreme Court case law that has addressed
this issue and discusses the recent Kansas Supreme Court
case that rejected precedent, but fails to shift the juvenile
justice paradigm.
Part II argues that social science research provides a
useful perspective from which to analyze whether specific
procedural rights should be granted to juveniles. The first
section examines research on why people obey the law. The
second section discusses the legal socialization of
adolescents and its influence on patterns of reoffending. The
third section suggests that when juveniles perceive that
they have been treated fairly by law enforcement and the
courts-a judgment shown not to be dependent upon the
outcome of the case-they are less likely to recidivate.
Part III begins the task of applying procedural justice
theory and related findings by social psychologists to thejuvenile court, an analysis that has not previously been
presented by legal scholars.2" The first section examines
system should adopt a justice model that incorporates both retributive and
distributive justice).
27. Shelly Jackson & Mark Fondacaro, Procedural Justice in Resolving
Family Conflict: Implications for Youth Violence Prevention, 21 L. & POL'Y 101,
102 (1999). Since the 1970s, social scientists have used the term "procedural
justice" to refer to the psychological effects of various decision-making models
(e.g. adversarial, inquisitorial, or a hybrid approach) on fairness judgments;
over the decades, experimental research and participant surveys have strongly
suggested that multi-factor or "hybrid procedures" are perceived as both more
fair, based on subjective assessments, and more accurate, based on objective
measures and empirical study, than traditional adversarial procedures. Mark R.
Fondacaro, Christopher Slobogin & Tricia Cross, Reconceptualizing Due Process
in Juvenile Justice: Contributions from Law and Social Science, 57 HASTINGS
L.J. 955, 975-81 (2006) (endorsing a more flexible view of due process); see also
infra Part II.
28. While legal scholars have acknowledged the value of examining various
juvenile court procedural models through the lens of social science research, a
rigorous analysis of the ways in which procedural justice theory can reframe the
1454 [Vol. 57
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how the theory could reframe the debate over whether
debate over whether to extend specific due process protections to juveniles has
not previously been presented. Very few law review articles discuss the concept
of procedural justice and its utility for juvenile delinquency court. See, e.g.,
Fondacaro et al., supra note 27, at 984-89; Amy D. Ronner, Songs of Validation,
Voice and Voluntary Participation: Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Miranda and
Juveniles, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 89, 93-94 (2002) (arguing that when criminal
defendants believe that the legal system has treated them with fairness,
dignity, and respect, they are more likely to cooperate with conditions of
disposition and probation and less likely to recidivate, and applying this to the
context of the interrogation of juveniles); see also Stephanos Bibas & Richard A.
Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal Procedure, 114
YALE L.J. 85, 111-12 (2004) (stating that mainstream criminal law scholarship
has been "slow to incorporate" the insights of social psychologists "regarding the
relational dimension of criminal wrongdoing into practice recommendations for
criminal justice reforms'); infra notes 239-51 and accompanying text (discussing
the work of scholars in the area of therapeutic jurisprudence and distinguishing
it from procedural justice theory). Legal scholars have, however, utilized
procedural justice theory to analyze other areas of the law. See, e.g., Brian H.
Bornstein & Susan Poser, Perceptions of Procedural and Distributive Justice in
the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
75, 81-85 (2007) (examining the role that procedural and distributive justice
played in claimants' satisfaction with the September 1lth Victim Compensation
Fund); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Procedural Justice in Nonclass Aggregation,
44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 6-11 (2009) (proposing that procedural justice theory
be applied to nonclass aggregation, and observing that procedural justice is
context-dependent); Deborah Epstein, Procedural Justice: Tempering the State's
Response to Domestic Violence, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1843, 1875-81 (2002)
(arguing that social science research suggests that those concerned with the
safety of domestic violence victims should not ignore batterers' perceptions of
fairness); Adam Lamparello, Social Psychology, Legitimacy, and the Ethical
Foundations of Judgment: Importing the Procedural Justice Model to Federal
Sentencing Jurisprudence, 38 COLUM. HuM. RTs. L. REV. 115, 155-65 (2006)
(proposing a process-oriented solution to federal sentencing jurisprudence based
upon the procedural justice paradigm and supported by empirical data and
social psychological research); Michael M. O'Hear, Plea Bargaining and
Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L. REV. 407, 420-32 (2008) (arguing that procedural
justice should be part of the plea bargaining reform agenda); see also Richard C.
Boothman et al., A Better Approach to Medical Malpractice Claims? The
University of Michigan Experience, 2 J. HEALTH & LIFE Sci. L. 125, 137-46 (2009)
(finding empirically that when doctors admit to medical error and compensate
their patients quickly and fairly when such error causes injury, the number of
new medical malpractice claims decreases, resulting in significant fiscal
savings); Kevin Sack, Doctors Start to Say 'I'm Sorry' Long Before 'See You in
Court,' N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2008, at Al (reporting that at hospitals that have
acknowledged a preventable error and apologized to the patient, the number of
malpractice filings have dropped dramatically, and hospitals have experienced
major savings in legal costs).
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juveniles have a constitutional right to a jury trial. The
second section applies the theory to the practice of allowing
juveniles to waive counsel and admit to criminal charges at
arraignment, which has been justified as enabling juveniles
to receive treatment without the delay that often results
from litigation of the charges. The third section applies the
theory to the practice of allowing school-based actors such
as teachers and administrators to serve as law enforcement
without providing traditional due process protections to
youth. The fourth and final section considers how
procedural justice theory might affect the role of the parent
in juvenile delinquency proceedings.
Part IV concludes by acknowledging the limits of
procedural justice theory as applied to juveniles; it offers
caveats and raises questions for moving ahead.
I. FROM QUID PRO Quo TO SUBJECTiVE BALANCING AND BACK
Perhaps because it was created to remedy the harsh
and unforgiving manner in which the criminal court system
dealt with young offenders,29 the juvenile court system
during the first half of the twentieth century was notable
for its procedural informality and lack of administrative
oversight.3" As juvenile dispositions became more punitive,
the quid pro quo exchange of rights for rehabilitation
29. See David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Juvenile Courts in the Early
Twentieth Century: Beyond the Myth of Immaculate Construction, in A CENTURY
OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 42, 43-45 (Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds., 2002)
(describing how the early proponents of juvenile court designed the system to
remove children from the harsh nature of the criminal justice system and to
shield them from the stigma of publicity).
30. See, e.g., Martin L. Forst & Martha-Elin Blomquist, Cracking Down on
Juveniles: The Changing Ideology of Youth Corrections, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 323, 328-39 (1991); Zimring, supra note 17, at 142-43
("Informal proceedings were preferred to formal ones, so that the delinquent's
needs could be determined. Broad and vague definitions of delinquency were
favored, so that all children who needed help would fall within the new court's
jurisdiction.'); see also Allison Boyce, Note, Choosing the Forum: Prosecutorial
Discretion and Walker v. State, 46 ARK. L. REV. 985, 987 (1994) (stating that
informality was seen as part of the rehabilitation process in the early years of
juvenile court); Kellie M. Johnson, Note, Juvenile Competency Statutes: A Model
for State Legislation, 81 IND. L.J. 1067, 1069 (2006) (stating, in the context of
advocating for juvenile competency statutes, that "[o]riginally, the juvenile court
system granted judges broad discretion to conduct very informal proceedings").
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inevitably broke down, resulting in juveniles receiving
neither effective treatment nor the procedural protections of
adults.3' From 1966 to 1970, the United States Supreme
Court entered the breach with a series of decisions that
relied upon the Due Process Clause for their grounding.32
This Part discusses these decisions as well as the recent
Kansas case in which the court utilized quid pro quo
analysis to hold that juveniles do have a Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial.
A. Defining Fundamental Fairness
During a four-year period beginning in 1966, the United
States Supreme Court addressed important aspects of the
juvenile delinquency process in three formative cases, each
of which relied upon the Due Process Clause rather than
the Sixth Amendment for its holding.33 The first, Kent v.
United States, held that before a juvenile's transfer to adult
criminal court, she must be given an opportunity for
hearing, counsel must be given access to relevant records,
and the court must accompany its transfer order with a
statement of reasons or considerations for its decision.34
While stopping short of mandating that all constitutional
guaranties applicable to adult criminal defendants be
31. See generally Joel F. Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary
System: Problems of Function and Form, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 7, 12 (outlining a
proposal for procedural reform in the juvenile courts based on the claims that
the promises of the movement had not been fulfilled and that the current
system precipitates recidivism and "destroys basic values and rights"); see also
David R. Barrett, William J. T. Brown & John M. Cramer, Note, Juvenile
Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and Individualized Justice, 79 HARV. L.
REV. 775 (1966) (evaluating juvenile adjudicatory hearings, the role of the
police, and the implications of these processes for the juvenile court system).
32. See infra notes 34-47 and accompanying text.
33. It is worth noting, however, that the Court's holdings in these cases were
also premised, at least in part, on grounds separate and discrete from that of the
Due Process Clause. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47-50 (1967) (holding that
the privilege against self-incrimination is available to juveniles through the
"unequivocal" language of the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 560
(1966) (analyzing the question of whether the transfer of a child from juvenile to
adult criminal court is a "critically important" proceeding under the language of
the District of Columbia's Juvenile Court Act).
34. Kent, 383 U.S. at 561.
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applied to juveniles, the Court held that it would be
"extraordinary" if society permitted children to be
transferred to adult court without these basic protections.35
The second and most comprehensive case of this period
was In re Gault, widely celebrated by attorneys and
advocates,36  which rejected the assertion that the
substantive benefits of the juvenile court process "more
than offset" the denial of due process rights to juveniles.37
Instead, upon holding that such due process rights as the
right to counsel, the privilege against self-incrimination,
and the opportunity for cross-examination of witnesses
apply to juvenile delinquency proceedings, the Court stated
that these protections may, in fact, be "more impressive and
... therapeutic" for the juvenile than the long-assumed
benefits of the juvenile system-namely, its informality and
the benevolence and compassion of the judge.38 Citing a
1966 report on juvenile delinquency by sociologists Stanton
Wheeler and Leonard Cottrell, the Court recognized that
when harsh punitive measures come on the heels of
"procedural laxness," a child may feel that she has been
35. Id. at 554, 556; see also McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545
(1971) (stating that the Court has "refrained ... from taking the easy way" by
holding that all due process rights granted to adults should apply equally to
juveniles, and has instead 'properly attempted to strike a judicious balance by
injecting procedural orderliness into the juvenile court system"' (quoting
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 234 A-2d 9, 15 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1967))).
36. See, e.g., Katherine R. Kruse, In re Gault and the Promise of Systemic
Reform, 75 TENN. L. REV. 287 (2008); Wallace J. Mlyniec, In re Gault at 40: The
Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court-A Promise Unfulfilled, 44 CRIM. L. BULL.
371 (2008); see also Thomas Adcock, Accolades, N.Y. L.J., June 2007, at 20
20(2007) (reporting on an awards ceremony and program commemorating the
40th anniversary of Gault); Sarah Viren, Rights & Wrongs-Programs Teach
Legal Rights to Elementary School Students, THE HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 15,
2008, at B1 (reporting on a program to teach children their basic legal rights,
inspired by the 40th anniversary of Gault); Press Release, Rutgers Law School,
Rutgers Law School Hosts Conference Marking 40th Anniversary of Landmark
Decision that Established Due Process Rights of Juveniles (Apr. 1, 2007),
http://news.rutgers.edu/medrel/news-releases/2007/04/rutgers-law-school-h-
20070401.
37. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 21 (1967). "[T]he appearance as well as the
actuality of fairness, impartiality and orderliness-in short, the essentials of
due process-may be a more impressive and more therapeutic attitude so far as




"deceived or enticed."39 As Wheeler and Cottrell have stated,
"Unless appropriate due process of law is followed, even the
juvenile who has violated the law may not feel that he is
being fairly treated and may therefore resist the
rehabilitative efforts of court personnel."4°
The Court was careful to situate its decision, however,
within the framework of due process balancing by
concluding that the provision of basic due process
protections to juveniles would by no means require that "the
conception of the kindly juvenile judge be replaced by its
opposite. 4'
The third case in this trio, In re Winship, decided three
years after Gault, held that because the Due Process Clause
requires application of "essentials of due process and fair
treatment," juveniles-like adults-are constitutionally
entitled to proof beyond a reasonable doubt during the
adjudicatory hearing.42 Again acknowledging that there is
"no automatic congruence between the procedural
requirements imposed by due process in a criminal case
and those imposed by due process in [a] juvenile case[ ], 941
the Court in Winship concluded without much explication
that to afford juveniles the protection of the highest
standard of proof would not "risk destruction of beneficial
aspects of the juvenile process."'
It is significant that the Court in each of these three
cases arrived at the decision to provide procedural
protections to juveniles based not on the specific Sixth
Amendment guarantees of notice, confrontation, counsel,
and trial by jury that are required for "all criminal
prosecutions, 45 but on the general language of the Due
39. Id; see also infra Part II.C (asserting that the Court in Gault recognized
the import and validity of procedural justice theory).
40. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 26 (quoting STANTON WHEELER & LEONARD S.
COTTRELL, JR., JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: ITS PREVENTION AND CONTROL 33 (1966)).
41. Id. at 27; see also Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966) ("But
the admonition [that the juvenile court] function in a 'parental' relationship is
not an invitation to procedural arbitrariness.').
42. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 367 (1970) (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. at
30).
43. Id. at 374-75 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also id. at 359.
44. Id. at 366.
45. The Sixth Amendment provides:
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Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' Some
commentators have suggested that applying this more
subjective or "interpretive approach" to the juvenile
delinquency process means that as long as procedural
mechanisms can be shown to be as "fair" as the Sixth
Amendment's adversarial model, they too may satisfy
constitutional requirements-even if demonstrably
different."
On the heels of cases that relied on conceptions of
"fairness" to grant procedural rights to juveniles, the United
States Supreme Court rejected the notion that juveniles
have a right to a jury trial in delinquency court." The Court
was divided as to the basis of McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,
however, as a plurality of justices agreed on the result
based on policy considerations and the presumed negative
impact of jury trials on juvenile court proceedings,49 while
concurring justices determined that the touchstone should
be both the Sixth Amendment and the concept of
fundamental fairness as established by the Due Process
Clause." Meanwhile, the McKeiver dissenters relied
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
46. Gault, 387 U.S. at 13-14, 30-31. The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment provides: ".... nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ... ." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV; see also supra note 33.
47. See, e.g., Fondacaro et al., supra note 27, at 956-57, 963-65.
48. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550-51 (1971).
49. Id. at 545-50; see also Martin Guggenheim & Randy Hertz, Reflections on
Judges, Juries, and Justice: Ensuring the Fairness of Juvenile Delinquency
Trials, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 553, 560-62 (1998) (stating that the McKeiver
plurality rejected the jury trial model as not necessary to achieve fundamental
fairness, because there was "no reason to doubt that judges would decide cases
as fairly as juries').
50. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 551-53 (White, J., concurring) (holding that
neither the Sixth Amendment nor due process requires juvenile jury trials, but
that the states are free to offer jury trials in juvenile court if they choose); id. at
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squarely on the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to
conclude that juveniles who are prosecuted for criminal acts
potentially triggering loss of liberty are entitled to the same
protections as adults accused of crimes.5
As suggested earlier, a critical part of the subtext
underlying the decisions of Kent, Gault, Winship, and
McKeiver is the matter of whether juvenile courts have the
necessary resources to perform in a parens patriae
capacity.52 Also explored is the question of whether the
juvenile court system is performing so well in regard to
rehabilitation and recidivism that due process safeguards
afforded to adult criminal defendants may be justifiably
withheld from young offenders.53 In the three United States
Supreme Court cases that have extended due process
protections to juveniles, these questions are answered in the
negative, with the Court stating that the system has become
sufficiently punitive and ineffective to warrant additional
procedural protections for juveniles.54 In McKeiver, however,
557 (Harlan, J., concurring) (holding that neither the Sixth Amendment nor due
process requires jury trials for either adult or juvenile defendants); id. at 553-57
(Brennan, J., concurring) (holding that the Sixth Amendment does not require
jury trials for juveniles, and that as long as jury trials are public, principles of
fundamental fairness are satisfied).
51. Id. at 557-63 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
52. See, e.g., McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 544 ("Too often the juvenile court judge
falls far short of that stalwart, protective, and communicating figure the system
envisaged. The community's unwillingness to provide people and facilities and
to be concerned, the insufficiency of time devoted, the scarcity of professional
help, the inadequacy of dispositional alternatives, and our general lack of
knowledge all contribute to dissatisfaction with the experiment."); In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1967) ("[1]t is important, we think, that the claimed benefits
of the juvenile process should be candidly appraised. Neither sentiment nor
folklore should cause us to shut our eyes, for example, to such startling findings
as that reported in an exceptionally reliable study of repeaters or recidivism
.... '); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555-56 (1966) ('There is much
evidence that some juvenile courts, including that of the District of Columbia,
lack the personnel, facilities and techniques to perform adequately as
representatives of the State in a parens patriae capacity, at least with respect to
children charged with law violation.").
53. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365-66 (1970) ("[Civil labels and
good intentions do not themselves obviate the need for criminal due process
safeguards in juvenile courts .... ').
54. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 365-66 (recognizing that children with
delinquency adjudications can be subjected to a loss of liberty comparable in
seriousness to felony prosecutions); In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 543 (citing evidence
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while the Court acknowledges that "the fond and idealistic
hopes of the juvenile court proponents and early reformers"
have not been realized, it qualifies its admission by
contending that "[this] is to say no more than what is true of
criminal courts in the United States. But failure is most
striking when hopes are highest."" More recently, the
Kansas Supreme Court also answered these questions in
the negative, rejecting McKeiver's reasoning not by shifting
the paradigm but by applying traditional quid pro quo
analysis.56
B. Kansas Fails to Shift the Paradigm
Although the Kansas Supreme Court did not provide a
detailed account of the facts of In re L.M. in its opinion,57
they are worth recounting for they are typical of juvenile
cases that are tried before a judge-a significant number of
which may be characterized by the insufficiency of the
evidence presented," resulting from judges who fail to apply
the beyond a reasonable doubt standard consistently and
prosecutors who overcharge young offenders.59 Sixteen-year-
of high juvenile crime rates and questioning whether the juvenile system is
effective to reduce crime or rehabilitate offenders) (citations omitted); Kent, 383
U.S. at 555-56 (stating that there is "much evidence" that some juvenile courts
lack the capacity to perform adequately).
55. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 543-45. But see id. at 545 (maintaining that if jury
trials are constitutionally required for juveniles, it would mean the end of the
"idealistic prospect" of juvenile court as "an intimate, informal protective
proceeding").
56. See infra notes 57-83 and accompanying text.
57. 186 P.3d 164, 165 (Kan. 2008) ("Further discussion of the facts is not
relevant to the issue on appeal and will not be discussed herein.").
58. Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 49, at 564-65 (citing multiple cases
from a single calendar year in which juvenile delinquency findings following
bench trials were overturned because of insufficient evidence); see also R.L.A.C.
v. State, 823 So. 2d 1288, 1291-92 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001) (juvenile adjudication
overturned due to insufficient evidence regarding juvenile's unauthorized use of
motor vehicle); In re C.M.T., 861 !-2d 348, 355 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (juvenile
adjudication overturned due to excluded evidence of child's mental disability);
infra Part III.B.
59. Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 49, at 564 ("The case law suggests that
judges often convict [juveniles after bench trials] on evidence so scant that only
the most closed-minded or misguided juror could think the evidence satisfied the
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt."); see also In re Anthony W., 879
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old L.M. was charged with one count of aggravated sexual
battery, a felony under Kansas law, and one count of
possessing alcohol as a minor, a misdemeanor.' The
testimony showed that L.M. met the victim,6 who was a
decade his senior, late at night outside a bar where she had
been drinking and arguing with her boyfriend. 2 After the
victim gave L.M. a cigarette and told him her name, he tried
to kiss her and licked the side of her face. 3 During the
assault, L.M. had his arms around her, but did not grab or
touch any other part of her body or touch any part of his
own body.' After the victim rejected his advances, L.M. let
her go; she then waited outside her home for her boyfriend
to return, as she did not have a key.65 Although the victim
did not sustain any injuries and felt it unnecessary to report
the incident, her boyfriend called the police.6 L.M. was
subsequently taken into custody without incident; he was
A.2d 717, 731-32 (Md. 2005) (overturning juvenile delinquency adjudication for
failure of trial court to require the state to provide independent corroboration of
accomplice testimony); Brief for Juvenile Law Center et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Appellant at 5-6, In re K.M.M., 885 A-2d 592 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005)
(No. 193-CW-2004) (arguing that juvenile adjudication be overturned as trial
court did not review evidence of father's ability to care for juvenile).
60. In re L.M., 186 P.3d at 165; Brief of Appellant at 2-3, In re L.M., 186 P.3d
164 (No. 06-96197-A).
61. For purposes of clarity, I refer here to the complainant as the "victim,"
though it is arguable, as explained infra, whether she was actually victimized in
any meaningful sense by L.M. Likewise, I refer to the incident as an "assault'
also for purposes of clarity, as it is again arguable whether the act reached the
level of "assault," as required by law.
62. Brief of Appellant, supra note 60, at 2; Amended Brief of Appellee at 2-4,
In re L.M., 186 P.3d 164 (No. 06-96197-A).
63. Brief of Appellant, supra note 60, at 3; Amended Brief of Appellee, supra
note 62, at 2.
64. Brief of Appellant, supra note 60, at 3; Amended Brief of Appellee, supra
note 62, at 2, 4. See generally KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3518 (2007) (defining
aggravated sexual battery as the "intentional touching of the person of another
... who does not consent ... with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual
desires of the offender ... [w]hen the victim is overcome by force or fear")
(emphasis added).
65. Brief of Appellant, supra note 60, at 3; Amended Brief of Appellee, supra
note 62, at 3.
66. Brief of Appellant, supra note 60, at 3-4; Amended Brief of Appellee,
supra note 62, at 4.
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questioned by police into the early hours of the morning,
showing signs of being intoxicated and confused.67
L.M., who had never before been arrested, was held in a
juvenile detention facility from the day of the incident,
August 11, 2005, until his first trial date on January 5,
2006, when he was released pending a new trial date one
week hence.6" On January 12, 2006, after his motion for ajury trial was denied and the case was tried before a judge,
L.M. was convicted of aggravated sexual battery and again
ordered detained until final disposition on February 7,
2006.69 The district court then sentenced him as a "Serious
Offender I to a term of eighteen months in a juvenile
correctional facility, but stayed the sentence and ordered
L.M. to be placed on probation" until age twenty.7 Pursuant
67. Brief of Appellant, supra note 60, at 4-5; Amended Brief of Appellee,
supra note 62, at 5-6.
68. Brief of Appellant, supra note 60, at 1, 5; see also Lois A. Weithorn,
Envisioning Second-Order Change in America's Responses to Troubled and
Troublesome Youth, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1305, 1389, 1424 (2005) (explaining that
removing juveniles from their homes should be a short-term last resort, and that
thousands of children are "placed or retained ... unnecessarily'); Emily N.
Winfield, Note, Judicial Policymaking and Juvenile Detention Reform: A Case
Study of Jimmy Doe et al. v. Cook County, 12 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 225, 227-
28 (2008) (stating that while juvenile detention facilities are intended for
"offenders who pose a particularly high risk" of reoffending or failing to appear
in court, "as many as seventy percent of juveniles are detained for nonviolent
offenses"); BARRY HOLMAN & JASON ZIEDENBERG, JUSTICE POL'Y INST., THE
DANGERS OF DETENTION: THE IMPACT OF INCARCERATING YOUTH IN DETENTION AND
OTHER SECURE FACILITIES 2 (2006), http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload
/0611_REPDangersOffletentionJJ.pdf (finding that while pretrial juvenile
detention facilities are not designed as a substitute for long-term detention
alternatives, many detained youth spend from a several days to a few months in
locked custody awaiting placement or transfer); THE ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND.,
REFORM THE NATION'S JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 3 (2009),
http://www.aecf.orgl-/media/PublicationFiles/JuvenileJusticeissuebrief3.pdf
("Juvenile justice systems routinely detain and incarcerate youth who pose little
or no danger to public safety, despite research that community supervision and
non-residential, evidence-based programs are more effective and vastly more
cost-efficient.").
69. In re L.M., 186 P.3d 164, 165 (Kan. 2008); Brief of Appellant, supra note
60, at 1-2.
70. In re L.M, 186 P.3d at 165; see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2369(a)(2)(A) (Supp.
2007) (defiing Serious Offender I as "an offender adjudicated as a juvenile
offender for an offense which, if committed by an adult, would constitute a
nondrug severity level 4, 5 or 6 person felony or a severity level 1 or 2 drug
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to Kansas law, L.M. was required to comply with the
conditions of sex offender treatment and sex offender
registration.7
Although not addressed in any detail by the Kansas
Supreme Court in its decision,72 the collateral consequences
of L.M.'s juvenile adjudication for aggravated sexual battery
were particularly punitive.73 In addition to the fact that
felony"). Such offenders may be committed to a juvenile correctional facility for a
term of between 18 and 36 months, with an aftercare term of between 6 and 24
months. Id.
71. In re L.M, 186 P.3d at 165; see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4906 (Supp. 2005);
see also Rick Kittle, KS.A. 22-4901 et seq.--Offender Registration in Kansas, 69
J. KAN. B. ASS'N 28 (2000) (discussing the history and application of the Kansas
Offender Registration Act).
72. In re L.M, 186 P.3d at 172 ("Given our decision that juveniles have a
[constitutional] right to a jury trial... we decline to analyze this argument.").
73. Brief of Appellant, supra note 60, at 17-29 (arguing that the Kansas
Offender Registration Act has significant punitive implications for juveniles);
Brief of Juvenile Law Center as Amicus Curiae in Support Appellant at 2-9,
L.M, 186 P.3d 164 (No. 06-96197-A) (arguing that the public disclosure
provisions of the Kansas Offender Registration Act constitute serious
punishment). L.M. was also convicted of the misdemeanor offense of minor in
possession or consumption of alcohol, which does not have comparable
implications or consequences for the juvenile offender. In re L.M, 186 P.3d at
165; see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 41-727 (2000); see also Joanna S. Markman,
Community Notification and the Perils of Mandatory Juvenile Sex Offender
Registration: The Dangers Faced by Children and Their Families, 32 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 261, 270, 282-83 (2008) (asserting that because confidentiality is
necessary for the rehabilitation of juvenile sex offenders, mandatory community
notification provisions are counterproductive); Timothy E. Wind, The Quandary
of Megan's Law: When the Child Sex Offender Is a Child, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
73, 116 (2003) ("[P]ublic notification law[s] cause . . . unnecessary stress to [ ]
juvenile offenders by exposing them to scrutiny and ridicule in the community,
further harming their efforts at rehabilitation and increasing the likelihood of
recidivism.); Michele L. Earl-Hubbard, Comment, The Child Sex Offender
Registration Laws: The Punishment, Liberty Deprivation, and Unintended
Results Associated with the Scarlet Letter Laws of the 1990s, 90 Nw. U. L. REV.
788, 792 (1996) (arguing that requiring juveniles to register as sex offenders
raises several potential constitutional violations); Brittany Enniss, Note,
Quickly Assuaging Public Fear: How the Well-Intended Adam Walsh Act Led to
Unintended Consequences, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 697, 716 (asserting that sex
offender registration laws jeopardize juveniles' employment, education, and
housing opportunities, and that a system of individual assessment would better
protect the public); Elizabeth Garfmkle, Comment, Coming of Age in America:
The Misapplication of Sex-Offender Registration and Community-Notification
Laws to Juveniles, 91 CAL. L. REV. 163, 203-04 (2003) (stating that public
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juveniles generally are more likely to be subject to
incarceration-and receive longer terms-than young adult
offenders charged with the same crimes74 and the fact that
juvenile delinquency adjudications can be used to enhance
sentences in adult criminal court,75 L.M. faced repercussions
resulting from the very nature of the offense charged.76 The
Kansas Offender Registration Act contains public disclosure
provisions that the Kansas Supreme Court had previously
considered "punishment" for purposes of ex post facto
analysis,77 giving credence to the argument that the
community notification provisions would be particularly
harmful to juveniles.7" Research on adolescent development
notification constitutes "government defamation by falsely labeling all sex
offenders as potential future predators without sufficient due process," making
the label of "dangerous predator" especially defamatory for juveniles). But see
Nancy G. Calley, Juvenile Sex Offenders and Sex Offender Legislation:
Unintended Consequences, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 2008, at 37, 40 (suggesting that
because many juveniles are given the opportunity to admit to reduced charges
or have their adjudications stayed, thereby avoiding sex offender registration
and community notification, this may have the unintended consequence of
allowing them to miss out on early intervention and appropriate treatment
opportunities), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/fedprob/December_2008tJu
venileSexOffenders.html.
74. See Megan C. Kurlychek & Brian D. Johnson, The Juvenile Penalty: A
Comparison of Juvenile and Young Adult Sentencing Outcomes in Criminal
Court, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 485, 498-503 (2004) (finding that juvenile offenders
receive longer sentences than do young adult offenders).
75. See, e.g., State v. LaMunyon, 911 P.2d 151, 158 (Kan. 1996) (holding that
while a juvenile delinquency adjudication is not a criminal "conviction," it may
be considered when calculating an adult offender's criminal history, even in
jurisdictions in which juveniles are denied the right to trial by jury); State v.
Kuhlman, 144 P.3d 1214, 1216-17 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that juvenile
adjudications count as criminal convictions for purposes of calculating statutory
penalties, even when the trier of fact is a judge and not a jury as long as other
procedural safeguards are in place).
76. Brief of Appellant, supra note 60, at 17-18.
77. State v. Myers, 923 P.2d 1024, 1041-44 (Kan. 1996) (holding that the
public disclosure provisions of the Kansas Offender Registration Act constitute
punishment).
78. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4904(a) (Supp. 2005) (stating that under
Kansas law, a person adjudicated as a juvenile offender for the commission of a
sexually violent crime is required to register with the sheriff of his county of
residence and that all identifying information is available to the public in person
or via the internet); see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4907(a), (b) (Supp. 2005)
(stating that information required to be disclosed on the sex offender
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also suggests that public notification inflicts a harm on
juveniles that is disproportionate to the offense.79
Rejecting McKeiver's contention that the benevolent
parens patriae character of the juvenile justice system
distinguishes it from the adult criminal system, the Kansas
court based its holding recognizing a jury trial right for
juveniles on the Sixth Amendment, rather than upon
general notions of fairness and due process."0 The court held
that since 1984, when Kansas adopted the United States
Supreme Court's reasoning in McKeiver,8 ' the legislature
had changed the language of the Kansas Juvenile Offender
Code by "negating its rehabilitative purpose" and aligning
its dispositional provisions with those of the criminal
sentencing guidelines, thereby creating a juvenile court so
similar to its adult counterpart that the jury trial right
registration form includes, but is not limited to, the offender's name, address,
date of birth, social security number, a photo, fingerprints, and a DNA sample).
79. See Patricia Coffey, The Public Registration of Juvenile Sex Offenders,
FORUM (Ass'n for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers, Beaverton, Or.), Winter
2007, at 6 ("The notion that public labeling will be productive in reducing risk
for further sexual offending is inconsistent with decades of theoretical and
research-based understanding of child development, delinquency, and social
psychology."); Phoebe Geer, Justice Served? The High Cost of Juvenile Sex
Offender Registration, DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L., July 2008, at 33, 34, 40-44
(asserting that because bright-line rules do not distinguish between "relatively
innocent, non-violent, and unlikely to be repeated" juvenile sex offenses and
those that are indicative of a violent criminal nature, a lifetime stigma results);
Michael Vitiello, Punishing Sex Offenders: When Good Intentions Go Bad, 40
ARIz. ST. L.J. 651, 674 (2008) (advocating major reform of the sex offender
registration system, as the punishment often does not fit the crime); Stacey
Hiller, Note, The Problem with Juvenile Sex Offender Registration: The
Detrimental Effects of Public Disclosure, 7 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 271, 287 (1998)
(noting that juvenile sex offender registration exposes children to "community
violence and social outrage"); No EASY ANSWERS: SEX OFFENDER LAWS IN THE
U.S., HuM. RTS. WATCH, Sept. 2007, at 9
,http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usO9O7webwcover.pdf ("Applying
registration, community notification, and residency restriction laws to juvenile
offenders... will [ ] cause great harm to those who, while they are young, must
endure the stigma of being identified as and labeled a sex offender, and who as
adults will continue to bear that stigma, sometimes for the rest of their lives.").
80. In re L.M., 186 P.3d 164, 170 (Kan. 2008).
81. See Findlay v. State, 681 P.2d 20, 21-22 (Kan. 1984), abrogated by In re
L.M., 186 P. 3d 164 (adopting the reasoning of McKeiver).
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could no longer be discretionary.82 While acknowledging
that most other state courts have declined to extend this
constitutional right to juveniles, the majority remained
"undaunted in [its] belief' that because the Kansas juvenile
justice system was now patterned after the adult criminal
system, McKeiver was no longer binding. 3 In this way In re
L.M. demonstrates that when the expansion of juveniles'
rights is based solely on the Sixth Amendment, the most
likely model will be adult criminal court, thereby failing to
shift the juvenile justice paradigm. Alternatively, when an
extension of rights is premised on procedural justice theory,
the new model can more readily be drawn from outside the
parameters of the criminal justice system.
While the Kansas decision establishes a bright line with
its reasoning, practical factors-including the power of
judicial precedent, fiscal constraints on the state's ability to
provide juvenile jury trials upon request, and law makers'
reluctance to appear "soft" on crime-have been paramount
in the determinations of other jurisdictions.' Some have
clearly distinguished the terminology and purpose of their
state's juvenile code from its criminal code, whether under
82. In re L.M., 186 P.3d at 168-70 (stating that the revised Kansas juvenile
code replaced non-punitive terminology with criminal terminology, aligned
juvenile sentencing provisions with adult sentencing guidelines, and removed
the protections that McKeiver had relied upon to distinguish the juvenile from
the adult criminal system). See generally Carla J. Stovall, Justice and Juveniles
in Kansas: Where We Have Been and Where We Are Headed, 47 U. KAN. L. REV.
1021 (1999) (stating that the principles underlying Kansas's revised juvenile
code represent a "significant changes from past practice," creating a system that
more closely models the adult criminal system); William T. Stetzer, Note, The
Worst of Both Worlds: How the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Have Abandoned
Juveniles in the Name of "Justice," 35 WASHBURN L.J. 308 (1996) (examining the
negative impact of Kansas's revised juvenile code on the juvenile justice
system).
83. In re L.M., 186 P.3d at 170-71; Kansas: No Rush Expected on Juvenile
Trials Ruling, JOPLIN GLOBE (Mo.), June 29, 2008, at Al (noting that the
majority in In re L.M acknowledged that it could not find support for its holding
requiring jury trials for juveniles in rulings of other states); see also In re L.M.,
186 P.3d at 172 (overruling Findlay based on the legislative overhaul to the
Kansas juvenile justice code).
84. See, e.g., Rachel Zimmerman, Lawyers Want Jury Trials for Juveniles
Under New Law, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 18, 1997, at Al (reporting
that opponents of the juvenile jury trial in Washington cite such concerns as
precedent, policy, and cost).
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due process, quid pro quo analysis or both.85 Others have
definitively held that the Sixth Amendment does not
mandate the right to a jury trial for juveniles.86 Courts and
legislatures that choose instead to rely on subjective
interpretations of due process when analyzing this issue
will inevitably revisit the question of how best to define
'fairness.' Under what standard should it be determined
that a specific procedural right is as fair as the adversarial
model envisioned by the Sixth Amendment? Such a query
85. See, e.g., State ex. rel. D.J., 817 So. 2d 26, 34-35 (La. 2002) (rejecting the
argument that Louisiana's juvenile system has become so similar to the adult
criminal system that jury trials are constitutionally mandated and holding-
under due process analysis-that jury trials are not required); see also Gwen
Filosa, La. Juveniles Get No Right to Jury Trial; Court Reverses Woodson
Ruling, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), May 15, 2002, at 1 (reporting that
the Louisiana Supreme Court held that juveniles do not have a constitutional
right to a jury trial under the Juvenile Code, as the system retains a "quid pro
quo" under which juveniles receive rehabilitation instead of punitive prison
time).
86. See, e.g., State v. Chavez, 180 P.3d 1250, 1252-53 (Wash. 2008) (holding
that a Washington state statute denying juveniles the jury trial right did not
violate the right to a jury trial under the state or federal constitutions); Laura
Onstot, Communist States Aren't the Only Ones Denying Jury Trials; In
Washington, Juveniles Have No Right to One, SEATLE WKLY., Mar. 26, 2008,
available at http://www.seattleweekly.com/2008-03-26/news/communist-states-
aren-t-the-only-ones-denying-jury-trials.php (stating that the Wash. Supreme
Court ruled 6-3 that juveniles have no constitutional right to a jury trial);
Stephanie Potter, Lifetime Sex Offender Registration Okd for Teenager, CHI.
DAILY L. BuLL., Aug. 22, 2008, at 1 (reporting decision of Illinois appellate court
denying jury trial to juvenile sex offender who must register annually for the
rest of his life, as the requirements "do not affect a protected property or liberty
interest'). But see Gerald P. Hill, II, Revisiting Juvenile Justice: The
Requirement for Jury Trials in Juvenile Proceedings Under the Sixth
Amendment, 9 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 143, 172-75 (2008) (arguing that because
there is no meaningful distinction between juvenile and adult criminal court,
the Sixth Amendment must be applied in full to juveniles, including the right to
trial by jury); Tina Chen, Comment, The Sixth Amendment Right to a Jury
Trial: Why is it a Fundamental Right for Adults and Not Juveniles?, 28 J. Juv.
L. 1, 7-10 (2007) (arguing that juveniles have a fundamental Sixth Amendment
right to trial by jury); Kerrin C. Wolf, Note, Justice by Any Other Name: The
Right to a Jury Trial and the Criminal Nature of Juvenile Justice in Louisiana,
12 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 275 (2003) (arguing that the Louisiana Supreme
Court decided the issue incorrectly, that juveniles should have a right to a jury
trial, and that McKeiver should be overruled); Steven A. Drizin, Op-Ed.,
Juveniles Deserve Jury Trials, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 22, 1999, at 31 (arguing that the
Constitutional right to a jury trial should be extended to juveniles).
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may be answered - at least in part - by recent empirical
research by social scientists. 7
II. EVIDENCE FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
Academic disciplines approach the study of crime and
criminal behavior from differing perspectives. Sociology -
one of the many disciplines from which to choose -
considers broad-spectrum structural explanations for
human behavior, with sociologists typically trained to focus
on the question of why people break the law."8 Social
psychologists, on the other hand, perhaps due to their
reliance on surveys of the general population, are more
likely to ask why people obey the law. " The focus of this
Part is on the latter rather than the former question,
premised on the notion that in a world of limited resources,
it is more pragmatic to examine the reasons why
adolescents comply with the law, rather than dwell on the
causes of their noncompliance.9" The discussion begins by
87. See infra Parts II and III.A (applying procedural justice theory to the
question of juveniles' right to a jury trial).
88. Andrew V. Papachristos, Tracey L. Meares & Jeffrey Fagan, Why Do
Criminals Obey the Law? The Influence of Legitimacy and Social Networks on
Active Gun Offenders 1-2 (Yale University Law Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. for
Studies in Law, Econ. & Pub. Policy, Research Paper No. 373, Columbia Law
Sch. Pub. Policy Research Papers, Working Paper No. 09-199, 2009), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1326631; see also JOHN E. CONKLIN, CRIMINOLOGY 17
(6th ed. 1998) ("Criminology is a discipline that gathers and analyzes empirical
data in order to explain violations of the criminal law and societal reactions to
those violations.").
89. Papachristos et al., supra note 88, at 1-2.
90. See Don W. Brown & Stephen L. McDougal, Noncompliance with Law: A
Utility Analysis of City Crime Rates, 58 Soc. ScI. Q. 195, 210 (1977) (finding that
when criminal offenders do a cost-benefit analysis in deciding whether to engage
in criminal conduct, the benefits of compliance rather than the costs of
noncompliance had the strongest effect); see also Howard N. Glasser, The
Nurtured Heart Model for Dealing with Challenging Children, OUTCOMES,
INNOVATIONS & BEST PRAC. (Cmty. P'ship. S. Ariz., Tucson, Ariz.), Fall 2000, at 2
(finding that a therapeutic approach to disciplining challenging children, in
which adults encourage them to perceive greater incentives for positive choices
than for negative behaviors, lowered recidivism rates and reduced the need for
medication to control behavior); Shirli Levinson Ward, Glasser's Parent
Training Model: Effects on Child and Parent Functioning 65 (Apr. 10, 1997)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Arizona) (on file with University
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examining social science research in the area of procedural
justice theory, takes up an analysis of how children and
adolescents develop ties to the law and legal actors and
concludes by demonstrating a causal relationship betweenjuveniles' perceptions of fairness and their likelihood of
reoffending.
A. Why Obey the Law?
Since the 1970s, preeminent social and behavioral
scientists who study criminal procedure have examined a
series of intersecting questions that relate to the central
problem of which legal system-adversarial, 9
inquisitorial," investigative, 3 or a hybrid94 -is the most
effective in reducing crime.95 The inquiry has been grounded
in procedural justice theory, the notion that people are more
likely to comply with law and policy when they believe that
the procedures utilized by decision-makers are fair,
of Arizona Library) ("[T]hose involved in Glasser's parent training program
demonstrated significant changes in functioning following treatment.').
91. See, e.g., Hans F.M. Crombag, Adversarial or Inquisitorial: Do We Have a
Choice?, in 17 PERSPECTIVES IN LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY, ADVERSARIAL VERSUS
INQUISITORIAL JUSTICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEMS 21, 21-24 (Peter J. van Koppen & Steven D. Penrod eds., 2003)
(describing the adversarial system as one in which the parties control the
presentation of the facts of the case, which are presented orally; judgment is
usually rendered by one's peers; and "fair play" is considered the proximate
goal).
92. See, e.g., id. at 22-25 (describing the inquisitorial system as one in which
the court controls the presentation of evidence, which is typically in
documentary form; where the court takes responsibility for finding the truth;
and where technicalities considered to "threaten" the search for truth are put
aside).
93. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348-49 (1976) ("The judicial
model of an evidentiary hearing is neither required, nor even the most effective,
method of decision-making in all circumstances . . . [and an administrative
hearing prior to terminating disability benefits] fully comports with due
process.").
94. See, e.g., Fondacaro et al., supra note 27, at 977-78.
95. See id. at 975-80 (discussing the work of pioneering social scientists,
John Thibaut, Laurens Walker, and Allan Lind, as well as more contemporary
researchers, Tom Tyler, Blair Sheppard, and Donna Shestowsky).
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unbiased, and efficient.96 Its proponents contend that
procedural fairness plays a "key role" in people's willingness
to cooperate with a wide range of decisions, from United
States Supreme Court rulings to corporate drug-testing
policies.97 The empirical research has focused on exploring
why people are either satisfied or dissatisfied with a
particular dispute outcome and whether there is a
relationship between the type of process used and one's
perceptions of systemic fairness;98 the finding that people
care enormously about the process and greatly value the
opportunity to "tell one's story," regardless of the outcome,
has been replicated across a wide range of methodologies,
cultures, and settings.99
During the past two decades, researchers have
continued to advance this work, applying procedural justice
theory to a wide range of literatures, including law,
medicine, business, education, and social work.' The
96. Id. (distinguishing between "subjective" procedural justice, which focuses
on the fairness of the system and "objective" procedural justice, which considers
the degree to which decision-makers are unbiased and rely upon accurate
information, and then examining the "costs" or efficiency of various procedures
in a given legal setting); Juan Ramirez, Jr. & Amy D. Ronner, Voiceless Billy
Budd: Melville's Tribute to the Sixth Amendment, 41 CAL. W. L. REV. 103, 120-21
(2004) ("Studies suggest that if the socializing influence of experience is the
issue of concern (i.e., the impact of participating in a judicial hearing on a
person's respect for the law and legal authorities), then the primary influence is
the person's evaluation of the fairness of the judicial procedure itself, not their
evaluations of the outcome .... When people believe that legal authorities are
less legitimate, they are less likely to be law-abiding citizens in their everyday
lives." (citation omitted)); see also Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S.
CAL. L. REV. 181, 238 (2004) ("[P]rocedural justice is concerned with the
adjudicative methods by which legal norms are applied to particular cases and
the legislative processes by which social benefits and burdens are divided.").
97. Robert J. MacCoun, Voice, Control, and Belonging: The Double-Edged
Sword of Procedural Fairness, 1 ANN. REV. L. & Soc. Sci. 171, 180 (2005).
98. Fondacaro et al., supra note 27, at 976, 981-82.
99. MacCoun, supra note 97, at 171-78 ("[The basic phenomena of
procedural justice have been documented across dozens of social, legal, and
organizational contexts involving every major demographic category in the
United States, and almost every major industrial country in North America,
Asia, and Europe." (citation omitted)); id. at 186-88 ("[Miost studies have found
striking similarities across demographic groups in the antecedents and
consequences of procedural fairness, suggesting a shared understanding of the
concept." (citation omitted)).
100. Id. at 172; see also Fondacaro et al., supra note 27, at 975-76.
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empirical studies of Tom Tyler, for instance, have explored
the differences between the instrumental perspective on
why people follow the law, which is dominated by
deterrence literature linking human behavior to incentives
and penalties (follow the law only if you are likely to get
caught),'' and the normative perspective on this question,
which relies both on personal morality (follow the law
because it is right) and adherence to legitimacy (because we
have confidence in the police and the courts, we should
follow the law)."°2 By focusing on the extent to which
normative factors influence compliance with the law
separate and apart from deterrence, the work of Tyler and
others has suggested that people obey the law when the
rules and procedures are consistent with their personal
values and attitudes; in other words, when people are
personally committed to obeying the law, they voluntarily
assume the obligation to follow legal rules, irrespective of
the risk of punishment.'03
In subsequent empirical work, Tyler has explored the
factors that contribute to the likelihood of deference to
authority among a variety of ethnic groups."° His results
suggest that the behavior of and processes used by police
officers and judges-if perceived to be fair and benevolent-
can encourage voluntary acceptance of decisions made by
legal authorities, which in turn can lead to lower rates of
101. See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 3, 23, 42-45 (1990).
102. Id. at 3-5, 22-27.
103. Id. at 19-27.
104. TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. Huo, TRUST IN THE LAw 49-75, 141-51 (2002)
(finding, based on a sample of interviews with Caucasian, African-American,
and Latino residents of two cities, that deference to legal authorities is shaped
by procedural justice and trust in the motives of legal actors, and that minority
group members are less willing to defer to the decisions made by legal
authorities as well as less likely to report that their experiences with legal
authorities are procedurally fair and unbiased); see also Jennifer L. Woolard et
al., Anticipatory Injustice Among Adolescents: Age and Racial/Ethnic
Differences in Perceived Unfairness of the Justice System, 26 BEHAv. Sci. & L.
207, 221-25 (2008) (finding that among adolescents with no criminal justice
system experience, greater proportions of African-Americans and Latinos
anticipate injustice than whites; among those with justice system experience,
expectations of injustice do not vary among racial and ethnic groups; and




reoffending.l°5 While it is arguable whether his findings are
consistent with human intuition, it is potentially useful to
have multiple data sets demonstrating that treating people
with dignity and respect makes them more likely to view
procedures as fair and the motives behind law
enforcement's actions as well-meaning. It is also of likely
utility to have data showing that when people consider
police and court procedures to be equitable and the motives
of authorities trustworthy, they are more likely to obey the
law. 106
Tyler references and builds upon the work of seminal
figures in the fields of psychoanalysis, sociology, and
economics to argue that social norms and values become
part of a person's internal motivational system and guide
behavior separate from the impact of the threat of power on
human behavior, which relies instead upon a traditional
system of incentives and sanctions. °7 In this way, self-
control replaces the need for control by others.'° According
to Tyler, one's sense of obligation to a certain set of rules is
the key element in the concept of legitimacy, as it leads to
voluntary deference. 9
Of further significance to the argument here are the
innumerable benefits gained through a procedural system
105. TYLER & Huo, supra note 104, at xiii-xiv, 57.
106. Id. at xiv, 57, 74-75; see also Keri A. Gould, Turning Rat and Doing Time
for Uncharged, Dismissed, or Acquitted Crimes: Do the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines Promote Respect for the Law?, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 835, 864-
65, 874 (1993) ("[A]t least one study has found that persons involved in felony
cases, who may be unfairly characterized as marginal adherents to society's
value system . . . are most influenced by procedural fairness rather than the
leniency of the sentence they receive.').
107. Tom R. Tyler, Introduction: Legitimating Ideologies, 18 Soc. JUST. RES.
211, 212 (2005) (referencing the work of Sigmund Freud, Emile Durkheim, and
Max Weber).
108. Id.
109. Id. ("Hence, unlike influence based upon the influencer's possession of
power or resources, the influence motivated by legitimacy develops from within
the person who is being influenced.') (citation omitted); see also Daniel W.
Shuman & Jean A Hamilton, Jury Service-It May Change Your Mind:
Perceptions of Fairness of Jurors and Nonjurors, 46 S.M.U. L. REV. 449, 451
(1992) (citing studies finding that one-third of the U.S. public believes the
judicial system is unfair, leading them to question its legitimacy, which in turn
affects their compliance with the law).
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that garners compliance that is voluntary and self-
regulating. Empirical evidence in this area suggests that
when forced compliance or coercive power is used on its own
to shape behavior, it is costly in terms of staffing, time, and
resources."' When people defer to legal norms out of a sense
of personal morality and legitimacy, however, fewer
resources are required." ' Thus, procedural justice theory
provides a savings in both human capital and material costs
when it is used to influence behavior, as the research
confirms that people are more likely to police themselves if
they believe that laws are fair, legitimate, and ought to be
followed. 12
While the work of Tyler and others has focused
primarily on adult populations, the influence of personal
morality on behavior toward the law has also been
examined in social science literature on child development
and juvenile delinquency. "3 Several studies have laid the
groundwork for exploring whether children who are
influenced by instrumental considerations of reward and
punishment are more likely to break the law than those
110. Tyler, supra note 107, at 212 ("When the public views government as
legitimate it has an alternative basis for support during difficult times. Further,
when government can call upon the values of the population to encourage
desired behavior, society has more flexibility about how it deploys its
resources.'); Tom R. Tyler et al., Armed, and Dangerous (?): Motivating Rule
Adherence Among Agents of Social Control, 41 LAw & Socy REV. 457, 470 (2007)
("Authorities are seldom in the position to expend excessive organizational
resources on monitoring and punishing employee misbehavior. The procedural
justice perspective suggests that people will comply with, and, more strikingly,
voluntarily defer to rules when they feel that the rules and authorities ... are
following fair procedures .... What makes such a finding optimistic... is that
the creation and implementation of procedures that all individuals perceive as
fair is not restricted in the same way that allocations of resources are.").
111. Tyler, supra note 107, at 212; Papachristos et al., supra note 88, at 4
(referencing the sociologist Emile Durkheim to argue that because forced
compliance is costly, the social order is best maintained when the majority
believes that the government is legitimate and that the legal structure is just);
112. Tyler, supra note 107, at 211-12. This focus on efficiency goes back to the
writings of social theorists during the time of Plato and Aristotle, who
recognized that influencing human behavior through the threat of power is both
"costly and inefficient." See also id. at 211.
113. TYLER, supra note 101, at 37, 65 (referencing the works ofAugusto Blasi,
among others).
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who are influenced by a sense of personal obligation, 14 but
the literature is thin and more research is needed. Thus,
while it may be suggested that normative concerns relating
to children's feelings of personal morality and legitimacy
influence compliance with the law in many of the same
ways as they do for adults, this connection has not yet been
made.
B. The Legal Socialization of Children
Behavioral psychologists who have studied adolescent
populations have generally focused on a question closely
related to that of why people obey the law-what factors
shape adolescent criminal behavior?" 5  While these
researchers have agreed that children's compliance with the
law is promoted by the processes of maturation and
psychosocial development,"1 6 some have recognized further
that legal socialization is a process that is not static
between childhood and adolescence but variable, changing
over time and developing concurrently with a child's
cognitive and moral maturation; it is profoundly affected by
one's peers, family unit, and neighborhood culture; and it is
interactive and integrative, a process in which children
internalize information that is assimilated from their own
experiences, from the attitudes and factual claims of others,
114. See, e.g., Augusto Blasi, Bridging Moral Cognition and Moral Action: A
Critical Review of the Literature, 88 PSYCHOL. BULL. 1, 11-13, 37-41 (1980)
(concluding that adolescents who reveal "higher stages of moral reasoning" are
less likely to engage in delinquent behavior because of feelings of personal
commitment rather than due to pressure to conform to the judgments of others);
Don W. Brown, Adolescent Attitudes and Lawful Behavior, 38 PUB. OPINION Q.
98, 105 (1974) ("The evidence presented here suggests that constraint between
reported non-compliance with laws and affective-evaluative orientations toward
law, legal authorities, and legal institutions tends to be greater among
individuals to whom law is more salient than among those to whom law is less
salient."); Gregory J. Jurkovic, The Juvenile Delinquent as a Moral Philosopher:
A Structural-Development Perspective, 88 PSYCHOL. BULL. 709, 720 (1980) ("On
the most general level, it appears that adolescents who have failed to relinquish
a premoral orientation . . at a time when their peers are moving to higher
stages are at risk for behavior problems, whereas those performing along more
conventional lines may or may not be at a similar risk.").
115. Jeffrey Fagan & Tom R. Tyler, Legal Socialization of Children and
Adolescents, 18 Soc. JUST. RES. 217, 217-19 (2005).
116. Id. at 218-20.
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and from the ways in which others react and respond to
them."7 The core argument underpinning the literature in
this area is that children develop an orientation toward the
law and legal actors early in life, and that this orientation
shapes their behavior towards authority from adolescence
through adulthood."'
Research in this area has shown that a myriad of
factors combine to shape and influence the law-related
behavior of children and adolescents, including institutional
legitimacy, an obligation to obey the law from a normative
perspective, legal cynicism, one's sense of whether it is
acceptable to act outside the law and social norms, and the
impact of moral ambiguity and disengagement, processes by
which adolescents detach from the system of internal
controls and moral values and become more open to illegal
behavior."9 Additional factors shaping criminal behavior
include the deterrent effect of punitive sanctions, in which
punishment that is perceived to be "swift, certain, and
severe" inhibits criminal activity, 2 ° and the theory of
rational choice, whereby behavior is determined by the
weighing of the costs and benefits associated with violating
the law.' Research has suggested, however, that active
adolescent offenders may be less sensitive to the threat of
sanctions and rational choice theory than either adults or
young people who have not previously engaged in criminal
activity; the reasons are twofold-immaturity causes youth
not only to underestimate the level of risk but also to
downplay the threat of punishment that is oriented toward
117. Id. at 219; Jeffrey Fagan & Alex R. Piquero, Rational Choice and
Developmental Influences on Recidivism Among Adolescent Felony Offenders, 4
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 715, 716 (2007) (describing legal socialization as a
"developmental process [that] results in the internalization of legal rules and
norms that regulate social and antisocial behaviors, and that create a set of
obligations and social commitments that restrain motivations for law violation).
118. Fagan & Piquero, supra note 117, at 716; Alex R. Piquero et al.,
Developmental Trajectories of Legal Socialization Among Serious Adolescent
Offenders, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 267, 270-74 (2005).
119. Fagan & Tyler, supra note 115, at 221; see also id. at 233-34 (stating that
the likelihood that a child will experience moral disengagement is dependent
upon the presence of deviant peers, exposure to violence, aggressive tendencies,
and one's neighborhood).
120. Fagan & Piquero, supra note 117, at 720.
121. Id. at 719-22.
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the future rather than the present.'22 Intellectual and
psychosocial deficits caused by developmental delays,
mental illness, and drug dependency can also "impair or
skew" rational calculations of risk and reward made by
adolescents. '23
Not surprisingly, procedural justice also plays a
significant role in the process of legal socialization, as social
scientists have demonstrated that perceptions of fair
treatment enhance children's evaluations of the law, while
unfair treatment triggers negative reactions, anger, and
defiance of the law's norms.'24 Specifically, researchers have
found that children's perceptions of fair procedures are
based on the degree to which the child was given the
opportunity to express her feelings or concerns, the
neutrality and fact-based quality of the decision-making
process, whether the child was treated with respect and
politeness, and whether the authorities appeared to be
acting out of benevolent and caring motives. 2 In this way,
procedural justice directly affects compliance with the law,
while indirectly affecting whether one views the law as
legitimate.'26 The next step is to explore empirically whether
a causal relationship exists between juveniles' perceptions
of fairness and rates of recidivism.
122. Id. at 721.
123. Id. at 721-22.
124. Fagan & Tyler, supra note 115, at 231, 233.
125. Id. at 222; Fagan & Piquero, supra note 117, at 719; see also Woolard et
al., supra note 104, at 223 (finding that anticipations of injustice shape
behavioral compliance with court officials and that adolescents with higher
levels of anticipatory injustice are less likely to confess to police, disclose
candidly to their public defender, and accept a plea agreement from the
prosecutor); infra Part IV.A (discussing the ways in which procedural justice
theory overlaps with the discipline of therapeutic jurisprudence).
126. Fagan & Tyler, supra note 115, at 231-36; see also Allison R. Shiff &
David B. Wexler, Teen Court: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspective, in LAW
IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY 287, 294 (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1996)
(arguing that because teen court gives impartial youth a "voice' in the juvenile
justice system, the experience increases their perceived fairness of the system,
encourages them to obey the law in the future, rehabilitates former juvenile




C. Recidivism and Adolescents' Perceptions of Fairness
In recent decades, social scientists have focused their
research more deliberately upon the question of whether a
causal connection between procedural justice and rates of
reoffending by juveniles may be shown through data
analysis. A sampling of recent research in this area includes
studies conducted among the following samples: children
and adolescents ages ten through sixteen from two racially
and socio-economically contrasting neighborhoods in
Brooklyn, New York; serious juvenile offenders ages
fourteen to eighteen in Phoenix, Arizona and Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania;"' young male prisoners ages fifteen to
twenty-four at a German detention center;'29 Canadian
youth ages fifteen to seventeen with cases pending in one of
the large youth courts in Toronto, Ontario; 30 and young
people ages fourteen to sixteen enrolled in an Australian
public high school with an ethnically and economically
diverse population.' The data from these studies, which
have focused to varying degrees on the relevance of
adolescents' views of the legitimacy of legal institutions and
legal actors, suggest a causal connection between
procedural justice and recidivism that is not outcome-
dependent. ,' While all such studies have their
127. Fagan & Tyler, supra note 115, at 223-25.
128. Fagan & Piquero, supra note 117, at 723-24.
129. Kathleen Otto & Claudia Dalbert, Belief in a Just World and Its
Functions for Young Prisoners, 39 J. RES. PERSONALITY 559, 562 (2005); see also
Louis Oppenheimer, The Belief in a Just World and Subjective Perceptions of
Society: A Developmental Perspective, 29 J. ADOLESCENCE 655, 665-68 (2006)
(finding that beliefs that the world is orderly and just begin to diminish at age
twelve, and that beginning at age sixteen, more sophisticated forms of reasoning
develop that enable individuals to handle a world that is neither orderly nor
just).
130. Jane B. Sprott & Carolyn Greene, Trust and Confidence in the Courts:
Does the Quality of Treatment Young Offenders Receive Affect Their Views of the
Courts?, CRIME & DELINQ., Mar. 12, 2008, at 7.
131. Lyn Hinds, Building Police-Youth Relationships: The Importance of
Procedural Justice, 7 YOUTH JUST. 195, 199 (2007).
132. See, e.g., Fagan & Piquero, supra note 117, at 739-40 ("These results
suggest that there are processes of legal socialization and rational choice that
influence patterns and trajectories of self-reported offending among serious
juvenile offenders.... Like adults, adolescent views about the legitimacy of
authority are influenced by procedural justice judgments about their own and
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limitations,133 a consistent trend based on multiple data sets
may be seen.
Relevant to this work is social science research
emphasizing a link between an adolescent's capacity to
stand trial and her ability to take responsibility for her
others' experiences with the police."); Fagan & Tyler, supra note 115, at 236
("This study suggests that these attributes of law shape norms and law-related
behaviors among adolescents, not just the views of adults .... Accordingly, this
study argues that beginning in adolescence legitimacy is an important force
shaping law-related behavior.n); Hinds, supra note 131, at 202 ("[llncreasing
young people's attitudes about the legitimacy of police should increase
compliance with police rules and decisions, and strengthen young people's
compliance with laws and commitment to social norms more generally."); Otto &
Dalbert, supra note 129, at 561 ("Taken collectively, perceiving the legal
proceedings as just may be the decisive factor allowing prisoners to accept their
sentence and develop an intrinsic motivation to obey the law in the future."
(citations omitted)); Sprott & Greene, supra note 130, at 15 ("Specifically, this
study found that above and beyond the youths' initial perceptions of the
legitimacy of the justice system and their overall satisfaction with the resolution
of their case, their views of the judge and their own lawyer significantly affected
their final views of the legitimacy of the court and legal system.'); see also
Richard E. Redding, Adult Punishment for Juvenile Offenders: Does it Reduce
Crime?, in HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN, CULTURE, AND VIOLENCE 375, 383-86 (Nancy
E. Dowd et al. eds., 2006) (discussing possible explanations for empirical
findings showing higher recidivism rates for violent juvenile offenders tried in
criminal, rather than juvenile, court, and suggesting that one reason may be a
"strong sense of injustice and resentment about being tried as adults').
133. See, e.g., Fagan & Tyler, supra note 115, at 237 (acknowledging that
further research is needed across a "wider range of neighborhood conditions"
and that because of the differences in legal socialization of males and females in
this sample, more samples of adolescent girls may be necessary); Hinds, supra
note 131, at 202-03 (acknowledging that the sample size in the study of
Australian youth was small and that the survey data was cross-sectional,
meaning that it did not examine young people's views using data collected from
the same individuals at two different points in time); Sprott & Greene, supra
note 130, at 16 (acknowledging that the sample size in the study of Canadian
juvenile offenders was small and limited only to those who had gone to trial and
received a community-based punishment, while excluding those who had
admitted their guilt and/or were sentenced to a period of confinement); see also
Susan S. Silbey, After Legal Consciousness, 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. Sci. 323, 337-
41 (2005) (questioning the model of fairness used in procedural justice studies,
and expressing skepticism of overly uniform survey results as well as
ethnographic studies that that do not squarely address people's perceptions of
fairness); infra Part IV.B (discussing the limitations of procedural justice
research).
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actions and thereby cooperate with rehabilitative services. 
34
The connection between a child's mental or emotional
capacity and her sense of accountability relates not only to
the criminal prosecution of young offenders, but also to the
civil context when commitment or long term in-patient
treatment is under consideration. Under these
circumstances, evidence suggests that allowing adolescents
to direct their own care enhances the ultimate effect and
impact of therapy.'35  Examining such issues from a
therapeutic perspective highlights the importance of
ensuring that juveniles have the opportunity for meaningful
and knowing participation in the legal system,136 whether
the threat to a minor's liberty comes from incarceration or
institutionalization. 137
As stated earlier in the context of discussing In re
Gault,"'38 sociologists and social psychologists acknowledged
the connection between a juvenile's belief that she was
fairly treated and the likelihood of her future compliance
134. Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy: Clarifying an Ageless
Conundrum, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1265, 1295 (2000) ('An offender is more likely to
have a positive response to treatment when he or she is able to take
responsibility for the behavior that the treatment aims to change."' (quoting
Richard Barnum & Thomas Grisso, Competence to Stand Trial in Juvenile Court
in Massachusetts: Issues of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 20 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM.
& CIV. CONFINEMENT 321, 336 (1994))).
135. Id. at 1330-31 (citing Kathleen M. Quinn & Barbara J. Weiner, Legal
Rights of Children, in LEGAL ISSUES IN MENTAL HEALTH CARE 309, 323 (Barbara
J. Weiner & Robert M. Wettstein eds., 1993)); see also Bruce J. Winick,
Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Civil Commitment Hearing, 10 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 37, 60 (1999) ("Restructuring the civil commitment process in the
ways suggested can significantly increase patients' perceptions of fairness,
participation, and dignity, thereby increasing the likelihood that they will
accept the outcome of the hearing . . .and will participate in the treatment
process in ways that will bring about better treatment results.').
136. Hartman, supra note 134, at 1296 ("If a mental disability prevents the
offender from appreciating what was alleged to have occurred or from taking a
reasonable role in establishing the facts of the matter, it is difficult to expect the
offender to become an ally in treatment."' (quoting Barnum & Grisso, supra note
134, at 336)); see also infra Part IV.A (discussing the discipline of therapeutic
jurisprudence).
137. Hartman, supra note 134, at 1330-31.
138. 387 U.S. 1, 26 (1967); see also supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
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with the law and legal actors more than forty years ago. '39
However, while the United States Supreme Court
recognized the import of procedural justice theory and its
potential impact on juveniles' recidivism rates in 1967, this
connection has not been advanced in Supreme Court
jurisprudence since Gault."4 While a handful of lower
federal courts and some state courts have referenced the
work of social scientists when determining whether
juveniles should be granted specific due process
protections, 4' this is only one of many areas in which
lawmakers and legal authorities would benefit from a fuller
139. STANTON WHEELER & LEONARD S. COTTRELL, JR., JUVENILE DELINQUENCY:
ITS PREVENTION AND CONTROL 33 (1966) ("Unless appropriate due process of law
is followed, even the juvenile who has violated the law may not feel that he is
being fairly treated and may therefore resist the rehabilitative efforts of court
personnel."); see also FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
19 (1964) ("A child brought before a tribunal ... will properly feela that he has
the right to receive from the court a sober and cautious weighing of the evidence
relating to that issue. He has, in short, a right to receive not only the benevolent
concern of the tribunal but justice. One may question with reason the value of
therapy purchased at the expense of justice."); Allan H. Horowitz & Nancy L.
Nickerson, Note, McKeiver v. Pennsylvania: A Retreat in Juvenile Justice, 38
BROOK. L. REV. 650, 689 (1972) (citing the Wheeler & Cottrell study to support
the juvenile's right to a jury trial, noting that the due process of a jury trial can
further rehabilitation by being "more impressive and more therapeutic" than
the informality of juvenile court).
140. A Lexis/Westlaw search of U.S. Supreme Court decisions since 1967
located only a single instance in which the Court referred to juvenile offenders
and the concept of procedural justice, though the reference is somewhat oblique.
Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 291 (1984) ("Juveniles [who are] subjected to
preventive detention come to see society at large as hostile and oppressive and
to regard themselves as irremediably 'delinquent."'); see also Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972) ( "[Flair treatment in parole revocations will
enhance the chance of rehabilitation by avoid reactions to arbitrariness.');
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-66 (1970) (suggesting that terminating
welfare benefits without a hearing could cause psychological harm).
141. See, e.g., In re H.L.R., 75 Cal. Rptr. 308, 313-14 (Ct. App. 1969) (noting
the importance of enforcing juvenile defendant's Miranda rights under
procedural justice theory, even when there is ample evidence of guilt); Lanes v.
State, 767 S.W.2d 789, 795-96 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (relying on procedural
justice theory to require that police officers have probable cause before arresting
a juvenile); see also Wallace J. Mlyniec, A Judge's Ethical Dilemma: Assessing a
Child's Capacity to Choose, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1873, 1886-1903 (1996)
(arguing that research on child development can be of assistance to judges who
must make ethical decisions in a variety of legal contexts that impact children's
lives).
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understanding of social psychology.'42  The next Part
demonstrates that having a deeper appreciation of the
factors that motivate juveniles' deference to the law can
better enable authorities to act in ways that encourage
children's cooperation. 43
III. APPLYING PROCEDURAL JUSTICE THEORY TO JUVENILE
COURT
Children's limited knowledge and understanding of the
criminal justice system, which has been explored at great
length in both social science research" and legal
scholarship,'45 underscores the importance of creating a
142. TYLER & Huo, supra note 104, at 176; see also Bernard P. Perlmutter,
"Unchain the Children" Gault, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, and Shackling,
BARRY L. REV., Fall 2007, at 1, 37-41 (arguing that when today's courts consider
the validity of juvenile court practices such as shackling, they should follow
Gault and utilize empirical research in the fields of criminology, sociology, and
public policy to inform their decisions).
143. TYLER & Huo, supra note 104, at 176.
144. See, e.g., Marty Beyer, Immaturity, Culpability & Competency in
Juveniles: A study of 17 Cases, CRIM. JUST., Summer 2000, at 26, 28-30, 33-35
(finding, based on empirical evidence, that young people do not understand the
words or concept of the Miranda warning, and that adolescents are "too
cognitively immature to assist in their defense'); Elizabeth Cauffman et al.,
Justice for Juveniles: New Perspectives on Adolescents' Competence and
Culpability, 18 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 403, 416-17 (1999) (discussing a study on the
relationship between judgment and psychosocial maturity that found that
adolescents make poorer decisions than adults because of immaturity); see also
Jennifer L. Woolard et al., Examining Adolescents' and their Parents'
Conceptual and Practical Knowledge of Police Interrogation: A Family Dyad
Approach, 37 J. YOUTH ADOLESCENCE 685, 694-97 (2008) ("[Plarents do know
more than their children about some aspects of interrogation .... However,
parents and adolescents sometimes have severe fundamental misconceptions
about the parameters of legal police interrogation procedures.'); but see
Cauffman et al., supra, at 413-15 (discussing the dearth of ecologically valid
social science research exploring adolescent competence to stand trial and
culpability).
145. See, e.g., Tamar R. Birckhead, The Age of the Child: Interrogating
Juveniles After Roper v. Simmons, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 385, 418-20 (2008)
(discussing, in the context of interrogation, the difficulties that children and
adolescents have understanding the meaning and consequences of legal
terminology); Michael Pinard, The Logistical and Ethical Difficulties of
Informing Juveniles about the Collateral Consequences of Adjudications, 6 NEV.
L.J. 1111, 1120-22 (2006) (stating that a "significant body of literature" has
questioned whether juveniles fully understand the nature of the criminal
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system that young offenders perceive as fair and
impartial." This goal is further supported by empirical
evidence suggesting a possible causal connection between
procedural justice and lowered recidivism rates forjuveniles.' 7 This Part begins the process of exploring how
these findings can guide judges and lawmakers when they
are evaluating procedural practices that impact juveniles.
A. A Jury of One's Peers?
As discussed earlier, courts typically have not drawn on
social science research generally, or procedural justice
theory specifically, when determining whether to extend
due process rights to juveniles.'4 8 Instead, jurisprudence in
this area has followed the traditional approach of
considering the question in terms of quid pro quo
exchanges of rights for treatment,'49 or in terms of due
process balancing that is not tethered to what is known
empirically about child development,'50 or a combination-or
blurring--of the two. While some legal scholars have
asserted that juveniles should have the right to a jury trial,
their arguments-though well-meaning-have been
premised on abstract notions of "fairness" rather than upon
empirical data related to procedural justice theory.''
process or appreciate the potential collateral consequences); Elizabeth S. Scott
& Thomas Grisso, Developmental Incompetence, Due Process, and Juvenile
Justice Policy, 83 N.C. L. REV. 793, 811 (2005) (citing recent research
demonstrating that youth under age sixteen are "significantly more likely" than
adults to lack the competence necessary to participate meaningfully in criminal
proceedings, and that this risk is "substantial" for youth under fourteen); Kim
Taylor-Thompson, States of Mind/States of Development, 14 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REV. 143, 152-56 (2003) (discussing the differences in decision-making capacities
of adolescents and adults).
146. See Ingrid M. Cordon et al., Children in Court, in ADVERSARIAL VERSUS
INQUISITORIAL JUSTICE PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEMS 167, 167-73 (Peter J. van Koppen & Steven D. Penrod eds., 2003).
147. See supra notes 127-33 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
149 See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
151. See, e.g., Susan E. Brooks, Juvenile Injustice: The Ban On Jury Trials
For Juveniles In The District of Columbia, 33 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 875, 894
(1995) (arguing that juveniles have the right to jury trials based, inter alia,
1484 [Vol. 57
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Likewise, others have contended that the jury trial right
should not be extended to juvenile court, based on
suppositions and anecdotal evidence regarding likely trial
outcomes, rather than empirical findings related to
adolescents' perceptions of the system and rates of
reoffending. 1"'
upon the connection between a juvenile's perceptions of having been treated
fairly and successful rehabilitation but not citing supporting empirical data); -
Hill, supra note 86, at 162-63 (stating that high recidivism rates for juveniles
justify providing them with jury trials that will allow them to understand the
seriousness of their conduct and seriousness of the proceedings); Ellen Marrus,
"That Isn't Fair, Judge" The Costs of Using Prior Juvenile Delinquency
Adjudications in Criminal Court Sentencing, 40 Hous. L. REV. 1323, 1350-51
(2004) (arguing that the lack of jury trials for juveniles results in error and bias
in judge-made adjudications, but not citing empirical research); Chen, supra
note 86, at 7-8 (citing several "benefits" to the jury trial right for juveniles, but
not mentioning empirical links between notions of fairness and lowered
recidivism rates); Sandra M. Ko, Comment, Why Do They Continue to Get the
Worst of Both Worlds? The Case for Providing Louisiana's Juveniles with the
Right to a Jury in Delinquency Adjudications, 12 Am. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y &
L. 161, 178-83 (2004) (arguing that juveniles should have a jury trial right in
delinquency court based on several factors, including the importance of
providing a proceeding perceived to be fair by juveniles, but not mentioning
empirical studies on procedural justice and recidivism); Sara E. Kropf, Note,
Overturning McKeiver v. Pennsylvania The Unconstitutionality of Using Prior
Juvenile Convictions to Enhance Adult Sentences Under the Sentencing
Guidelines, 87 GEO. L.J. 2149, 2170 (1999) (arguing that "perceptions matter"
and that denying juveniles the right to a jury trial will cause them to feel they
have not been treated fairly, but not referencing empirical evidence or
procedural justice theory); Jaime L. Preciado, Comment, The Right to a Juvenile
Jury Trial in Wisconsin: Rebalancing the Balanced Approach, 1999 WIs. L. REV.
571, 601-05 (arguing that juvenile jury trials provide "important safeguards for
the overall quality of justice," and that the jury system gives citizens a voice and
is necessary for "fair, impartial" trials for juveniles, but not mentioning the
connection between procedural justice and recidivism); Wolf, supra note 86, at
299, 302 (articulating "positive effects" of juries on the juvenile justice system,
but not addressing the perceptions of juveniles themselves or how they might
impact recidivism rates); see also McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 561-
62 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that juveniles who perceive
the system as fair are more likely to be successfully rehabilitated, but not
referencing empirical data).
152. See, e.g., Irene Merker Rosenberg, Leaving Bad Enough Alone: A
Response to the Juvenile Court Abolitionists, 1993 WIs. L. REV. 163, 169
(characterizing the jury trial right for juveniles as merely a "chip to be used in
the poker game of plea bargaining," and stating that the loss of this right is by
no means "catastrophic" because the penalties in juvenile court are less punitive
than in adult court). But see Janet E. Ainsworth, Youth Justice in a Unified
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To engage in a rigorous examination of how procedural
justice theory could reframe this particular debate would
require an interdisciplinary approach that most courts and
lawmakers have thus far resisted or have failed to
acknowledge as having potential value from a public policy
perspective. Funding empirical studies that focus on the
question of how juveniles perceive the jury trial right would
be an apt starting point. 53 Specific areas of inquiry could
include an examination of whether young offenders denied
the right believed that the juvenile justice system was fair;
whether those with the right were satisfied with the
handling of their cases; and whether the right to a jury trial
appears to reduce recidivism. These findings could then be
used to inform judges and lawmakers when deciding
whether, and on what basis, to extend the jury trial right to
juvenile offenders.
This is not to say, however, that such an examination
would be easy or that it would clearly point in one direction
or another. As stated earlier, social science data is limited
in its utility. 154 It is undeniable, however, that allowing such
data to inform and potentially reframe the discussion can
add much-needed texture and nuance. In addition, an
empirical examination of whether jury trials heighten
juveniles' perceptions of fairness, thereby lowering rates of
reoffending, need not end there but can serve as the opening
for considering other adjudicative options and procedural
strategies for juvenile court-from victim-offender
mediation, 155 restorative justice programs,156  and the
Court: Response to Critics of Juvenile Court Abolition, 36 B.C. L. REV. 927, 942-
44 (1995) (emphasizing the "transformative" power of the jury trial right for
juveniles); Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 49, at 562-71 (finding that judges
are more likely than jurors to weigh evidence in favor of the prosecution and are
less likely to assess the credibility of the accused with an open mind,
particularly in juvenile court).
153. See Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 28, at 131-32 (providing a meta-
analysis of empirical studies that have compared victim-offender mediation and
family conferencing with traditional criminal justice mechanisms).
154. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
155. See, e.g., William R. Nugent et al., Participation in Victim-Offender
Mediation and the Prevalence and Severity of Subsequent Delinquent Behavior:
A Meta-Analysis, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 137, 161-65 ("[P]articipation in [victim-
offender mediation] is clearly associated with a decrease in subsequent
delinquent behavior that leads to an adjudication of guilt, .... [that victim
offender -rehabilitation participants are] reoffending at a rate nearly 27% lower
1486 [Vol. 57
2009] JUSTICE FOR JUVENILES 1487
therapeutic role that apology and remorse can play57 to
waiving counsel, appearing pro se, and admitting at
arraignment.58
Further, given the informality of most juvenile
courtrooms, an unanswered question is how much traction
procedural justice theory can achieve in this setting. In a
regime that functions largely by means of streamlined
admissions and not protracted-or even contested-
hearings,'59 introducing notions of procedural justice in a
meaningful way poses distinct challenges. Unless the
delinquency court process can be retooled so that even those
offenders with straightforward, readily resolved matters are
given the space to experience procedural justice, the
endeavor will not succeed. The values of procedural justice
theory must be transparently communicated to all children
than that of nonparticipants ..... [and that] restorative justice philosophy may
hold great promise for the development of juvenile justice practices that lead
tomore positive outcomes for victims, juveniles, and for the general public.").
156. See TONY F. MARSHALL, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: AN OVERVIEW 5-8 (1999),
available at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs/occ-resjus.pdf (discussing
programs of community mediation, victim-offender mediation, and community
conferencing in which the parties in a case collectively resolve how best to
address the disposition of the matter and then determine its implications for the
future). Restorative justice is innovative in the sense that it is "concerned with
the breakdown of the barriers between legal processes (the 'criminal justice
system') and community action, including the introduction of personal
involvement in what are generally impersonal, highly regularized, often
bureaucratic, procedures." Id. at 23; see also CAROL LUPTON & PAUL NIXON,
EMPOWERING PRACTICE: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF THE FAMILY GROUP
CONFERENCE APPROACH 115-37 (1999) (describing a decision-making process
utilized in child welfare systems in Great Britain that focuses on the family's
strengths rather than its weaknesses, better enabling the participation and
empowerment of all members of a child's family).
157. See, e.g., Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 28, at 113-21, 131-34 (citing
empirical studies finding that both adult and juvenile offenders who participate
in mediation and similar mechanisms are more likely to feel that the criminal
justice system was fair and less likely to recidivate).
158. See infra notes 161-186 and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., STEVEN M. Cox, ET AL., JUVENILE JUSTICE: A GUIDE TO THEORY,
POLICY, AND PRACTICE 194-96 (6th ed. 2008) ("[The nature of the charges, the
plea, and the punishment are negotiated and agreed on before the defendant
actually enters the courtroom. The adversarial system . . . has been
circumvented.'); see also DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY
200-02 (1977) (discussing the failure of defense counsel to protect a juvenile
offender's right to remain silent).
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and adolescents who find themselves under the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court; this may, in fact, be the greatest
hurdle to overcome.
B. Waiving Counsel and Admitting at Arraignment
If juveniles' perceptions of fairness are not outcome-
dependent, as empirical studies have suggested, 160 and if the
opportunity for a young offender to speak in open court and
be heard is a critical component to achieving a meaningful
court experience, what of the oft-touted option of allowing
children and adolescents to waive their right to counsel and
admit to pending charges at arraignment? 6' How might
empirical data inform judges and law makers as to whetherjuveniles consider such a scheme to be fair, thereby
increasing the likelihood of successful rehabilitation, or
unfair, suggesting that reoffending rates would increase? Do
young offenders perceive this to be a just balancing, as
services could potentially be provided more quickly and a
protracted adversarial process avoided? Or do juveniles
view the summary imposition of such programs as punitive
and lacking in beneficial value?'62
The current state of United States law on the right of
juveniles to waive counsel in delinquency court is somewhat
mixed.163 While In re Gault requires that every state provide
160. See supra notes 127-33 and accompanying text.
161. See, e.g., In re Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JV-108721 and F-
327521, 798 P.2d 364, 366-67 (Ariz. 1990) (relying on a rule of court that
specifically allowed juveniles to waive their right to counsel); In re Manuel R.,
543 A.2d 719, 723 (Conn. 1988) (upholding the right of juveniles to waive
counsel); In re State, 252 A.2d 237, 239-41 (Juv. & Domestic Rel. Ct. Union
County, N.J. 1969) (supporting a juvenile's right to waive counsel based on the
proposition that competence to waive counsel is a question of fact, not law, even
for juveniles). In the spirit of clarity, the term "arraignment" as used here is
meant to refer to a juvenile's initial appearance on pending delinquency charges
for felonies as well as to the first court date for adjudication of misdemeanor
charges.
162. See infra notes 236-37 and accompanying text (discussing the negative
perceptions that many juveniles have of required rehabilitative programs and
services).
163. Ellen Marrus, Best Interests Equals Zealous Advocacy: A Not So Radical
View of Holistic Representation for Children Accused of Crime, 62 MD. L. REV.
288, 316-17 (2003) ("[Sltates are currently inconsistent in their handling of
waivers of counsel by juveniles.").
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counsel to juveniles accused of crime, at least at the
adjudicatory phase,'" this does not mean that young
offenders must accept legal representation, but only that
they have the right to counsel if they request
representation. '65 Very few states require mandatory
appointment of counsel in juvenile cases with no option for
waiver." In these states, a juvenile may neither waive
counsel nor represent herself even for the limited purpose of
pleading guilty, as such are considered to be "intentional
relinquishment" of known rights that are inapplicable to
juveniles. '67 In a substantial minority of states, waiver of
counsel may only occur under limited circumstances,
requiring a rigorous inquiry into the validity of the waiver
or proof by clear and convincing evidence that the juvenile
waived knowingly and intelligently and that the waiver was
in her best interests.'68 In the remaining majority of states,
children may waive their right to counsel at any stage of the
proceedings, as long as it is determined to be-based on a
variety of criteria-voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. 169
164. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967) (holding that the right to counsel
applies to juvenile delinquency proceedings); see also PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, The Challenge of Crime in a Free
Society 86-87 (1967) (stating that in order to assure "procedural justice for the
child," counsel should be appointed "without requiring any affirmative choice"
by the juvenile or the parent).
165. Marrus, supra note 163, at 316.
166. RANDY HERTZ ET AL., TRIAL MANUAL FOR DEFENSE ATTORNEYS IN JUVENILE
COURT 54-55 (1991) (stating that Iowa and Texas have prohibited the waiver of
counsel by juveniles, that Wisconsin prohibits waiver by juveniles under age 15,
and that several other states permit waiver but only after the juvenile has been
advised of the consequences of waiver by an attorney, judge, or after a hearing);
Tory J. Caeti et al., Juvenile Right to Counsel: A National Comparison of State
Legal Codes, 23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 611, 622-23 (1996); Robert E. Shepherd, Jr.,
Juvenile's Waiver of the Right to Counsel, CRIM. JUST., Spring 1998, at 38, 38
(citing the state codes of Iowa and Texas).
167. Marrus, supra note 163, at 316.
168. See Caeti, supra note 166, at 622-23 (finding that seventeen states have
a per se rule against waiver by juveniles or have very strict waiver
requirements); Shepherd, supra note 166, at 38 (citing the laws of Virginia, New
York, and Minnesota).
169. Marrus, supra note 163, at 316-18. But see Barry C. Feld, The Right to
Counsel in Juvenile Court: An Empirical Study of When Lawyers Appear and the
Difference They Make, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1185, 1324-25 (1989)
("[T]he lack of guidelines as to how the various factors should be weighed ....
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As found in a review of legal scholarship on the
juvenile's right to a jury trial, 7 0 very few law review articles
on the role of counsel in juvenile court are grounded in
empirical evidence or reference the connections among
perceptions of fairness, procedural justice theory and
recidivism. 7' Again, while there are many who argue
against allowing juveniles to waive counsel, these well-
intentioned critiques are generally premised on claims-
whether corroborated or not-that children and their
parents lack the ability to intelligently waive their rights, 
7 2
result in virtually unlimited and unreviewable judicial discretion to deprive
juveniles of their most fundamental procedural safeguard-the right to
counsel.").
170. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
171. See, e.g., Kristin Henning, Loyalty, Paternalism, and Rights: Client
Counseling Theory and the Role of Child's Counsel in Delinquency Cases, 81
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 285-86, 301 (2005) (calling for a model of advocacy that
gives the child a meaningful voice in the attorney-client relationship, based on
the notion that this would promote rehabilitation as well as the public safety
objectives of the juvenile court); see also JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS:
STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS § 6.1 (Inst. of Judicial
Admin. & Am. Bar Assoc. 1980) ("A juvenile's right to counsel may not be
waived."); Scott Barclay, A New Aspect of Lawyer-Client Interactions: Lawyers
Teaching Process-Focused Clients to Think About Outcomes, 11 CLINICAL L. REV.
1, 5, 10-13 (2004) (presenting an empirical study of civil litigants that focused on
why individuals appeal from adverse decisions in civil cases, and concluding
that lawyers are more outcome-focused in defining the goals of their legal
actions, while clients have more process-focused goals for appealing, including
achieving retribution, gaining access to a fair decision-maker, and creating
systemic change); NAT'L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT,
Justice Denied: America's Continuing Neglect of Our Constitutional Right to
Counsel 183-99 (2009), http://tcpjusticedenied.org/ (identifying the systemic
failures of the indigent defense system, including suggestions for improving the
waiver system that would protect the accused); ROBIN WALKER STERLING, THE
ROLE OF JUVENILE DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DELINQUENCY COURT 7-24, 60 (2009),
http://www.njdc.info/pdfrole-of juveniledefensecounsel.pdf (providing a
detailed description of the role of juvenile defense counsel, including stating that
one of the first principles of the public defense delivery system is ensuring that
cousel is not waived and that counsel is assigned as soon as possible).
172. See, e.g., Jerry R. Foxhoven, Effective Assistance of Counsel: Quality of
Representation for Juveniles is Still Illusory, 9 BARRY L. REV. 99, 106-11 (2007)
(discussing evidence that many juvenile waivers of counsel are not knowing and
voluntary, and arguing against allowing waivers, but not corroborating the
claims with social science research or providing a developmental perspective);
Norman Lefstein et al., In Search of Juvenile Justice: Gault and Its
Implementation, 3 L. & Soc'Y REV. 491, 537-38 (1969) (arguing against allowing
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the assumption that lawyers for children invariably improve
their clients' adjudicative outcomes,'73 or a combination of
the two.'74 Similarly, those who contend that juveniles
should be allowed to waive the right to counsel often do so
based on abstract notions of adolescent autonomy without
grounding in social science research.175
Barry Feld is one of the few scholars who has conducted
empirical work on the impact that counsel has on the
juveniles to waive the right to counsel because "social factors" militate against
the likelihood that minors and their parents are "capable of intelligent and
objective waivers of their rights," but offering no corroboration of the claim); see
also Kenneth J. King, Waiving Childhood Goodbye: How Juvenile Courts Fail to
Protect Children from Unknowing, Unintelligent, and Involuntary Waivers of
Miranda Rights, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 431, 434-44 (relying on research in the areas
of adolescent psychosocial and brain development to argue that minors have a
limited capacity to waive rights, but not exploring juveniles' perceptions of
procedural justice as they relate to the waiver of such rights).
173. See, e.g., Mary Berkheiser, The Fiction of Juvenile Right to Counsel:
Waiver in the Juvenile Courts, 54 FLA. L. REV. 577, 609-22, 650 (2002)
(advocating the prohibition of juvenile waiver of counsel based on juveniles' lack
of capacity and public policy, and rejecting concerns regarding the violation of
juveniles' right to autonomy, but not addressing the question of whether
mandatory representation serves notions of procedural justice); Lefstein et al.,
supra note 172, at 539-43 (asserting without corroboration that a juvenile would
be prejudiced if allowed to waive the representation of counsel). But see infra
notes 177-80 and accompanying text.
174. See, e.g., Hearing on H.B. 1508 Before the H. Comm. on the Admin. of
Crim. Just., 2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2004) (statement of Ernestine Gray, Co-
Chair, ABA Juvenile Justice Comm.), available at http://www
.njdc.info/pdf]18_LAaba.pdf ("Consulting with counsel and counsel's subsequent
presence in court is crucial because few juveniles have the experience and
understanding to decide meaningfully that the assistance of counsel would not
be helpful.").
175. See, e.g., In re Manuel R., 543 A.2d 719, 723 (Conn. 1988) (rejecting
arguments for a per se rule prohibiting juveniles from waiving counsel, which
was premised on empirical research on the lack of capacity of children, and
asserting that such a rule would compromise the right of adolescents to make
autonomous decisions regarding their legal representation). But see Martin
Guggenheim, The Right to Be Represented But Not Heard: Reflections on Legal
Representation for Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 76, 82-93 (1984) (advocating for
an expressed interest approach of representation in which the child is allowed to
direct her own counsel in delinquency proceedings, but acknowledging that the
matter should be informed by social science and moral philosophy); Hartman,
supra note 134, at 1282, 1298 ( "[I]mplicit in [the U.S. Supreme Court's] rulings
affording constitutional rights to adolescents is the corollary ability to exercise
or waive those rights.").
1492 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57
adjudications and dispositions of juvenile clients. While he
acknowledges the study's limitations,'76 his findings and
those of others suggest-somewhat surprisingly-that
juveniles with counsel are more likely to be incarcerated
and to receive other punitive sanctions than those without
counsel.'77 While the causes are difficult to determine
conclusively, Feld surmises that the presence of juvenile
defense lawyers may antagonize judges, and conversely,
that judges may be more lenient towards juveniles who are
not represented.' Feld does not reason, however, that thisjustifies allowing juveniles to waive counsel; on the
contrary, he argues that waiver should not be allowed and
that a mandatory representation model would "wash out"
the apparently negative effects of assistance of counsel.'79
Recognizing that non-waivable counsel for all juveniles may
176. Feld, supra note 169, at 1332-33 (acknowledging that the relationship
between the presence of counsel and the increased severity of disposition may be
"spurious," as a single study cannot "control for all the variables that influence
dispositional decision-making").
177. Barry C. Feld, A Century of Juvenile Justice: A Work in Progress or a
Revolution that Failed?, 34 N. Ky. L. REV. 189, 219-21, 228-30 (2007) (stating,
based on empirical research, that when juveniles are represented in delinquency
court, they are less likely to have positive outcomes); Feld, supra note 169, at
1208-09, 1236-37, 1259, 1330 (finding that empirical research shows that
juveniles actually have worse outcomes in delinquency court when they are
represented by counsel); see also George W. Burruss, Jr. & Kimberly Kempf-
Leonard, The Questionable Advantage of Defense Counsel in Juvenile Court, 19
JUST. Q. 37 (2002) (finding that the presence of an attorney consistently
increased the likelihood of juveniles receiving out-of-home placements in all
settings).
178. Feld, supra note 177, at 228-30 (suggesting that represented juveniles
may fare worse than those who are pro se because their lawyers may be
inexperienced, incompetent, biased, or overworked, and that judges may punish
such juveniles more severely because they believe the presence of counsel
insulates them from appellate reversal); Feld, supra note 169, at 1238. It is also
possible that Feld's findings result, at least in part, from selection bias, meaning
that juveniles who are likely to either retain or accept appointed counsel may
have been charged with more serious offenses, thereby leading to more punitive
sanctions for reasons other than those suggested above. See also N. Lee Cooper
et al., Fulfilling the Promise of In re Gault, Advancing the Role of Lawyers for
Children, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 651, 658-63 (1998) (discussing the systemic
causes of ineffective representation in juvenile courts, the many reasons that
children waive counsel, and the ways in which the "cumulative effect of these
factors is a derogation of juvenile court practice itself').
179. Feld, supra note 169, at 1326-27.
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not be realistic in practice, Feld suggests instead that a per
se requirement of consultation with counsel prior to waiver
be introduced or, in the alternative, a prohibition on
removing a child from her home or incarcerating her
without providing the advice of counsel.'80
The right to waive counsel and appear as a pro se
defendant was established by the United States Supreme
Court in Johnson v. Zerbst"' and Faretta v. California'82
when it held that a criminal defendant has a constitutional
right to waive counsel when the decision is made knowingly
and intelligently.'83 The Court has not directly ruled on
whether this right extends to juveniles, but it has held that
minors can waive their pre-trial right to counsel during
interrogation under the "totality of the circumstances"
standard." Empirical research has shown, however, that
juveniles are not as competent as adults to waive their right
to counsel in a manner that is knowing and intelligent.85
180. Id. at 1329-30.
181. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
182. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
183. Id. at 835; see Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464-65; see also Scott v. Illinois, 440
U.S. 367, 374 (1979) (holding that it is improper to incarcerate an adult
defendant, even for a minor offense, without the appointment of counsel or a
valid knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel).
184. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725-26 (1979). But see Birckhead, supra
note 145, at 424-26 (analyzing the Michael C. decision from a critical
perspective, and contending that young suspects require safeguards that adults
do not, and that they lack the capacity to waive counsel and be interrogated
without the presence of an adult).
185. See, e.g., THOMAS GRISSO, JUVENILES' WAIVER OF RIGHTS: LEGAL AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL COMPETENCE 41-93, 109-60 (1981) (finding that juveniles ages
fourteen and younger were significantly less likely to comprehend their rights to
counsel than older teens and adults, and finding that intelligence strongly
correlates with the understanding of one's legal rights); Barry C. Feld, Police
Interrogation of Juveniles: An Empirical Study of Policy and Practice, 97 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 219, 233 (2006) (finding that juveniles under sixteen
had the most difficulty exercising their Miranda rights and their adjudicative
competence); Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles' Competence to Stand Trial: A
Comparison of Adolescents' and Adults' Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 333, 333-63 (2003) (finding that adolescents performed more
poorly than adults during testing to measure competence to stand trial);
Melinda G. Schmidt et al., Effectiveness of Participation as a Defendant: The
Attorney-Juvenile Client Relationship, 21 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 175, 177-78, 193
(2003) (discussing empirical studies that have demonstrated juveniles'
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Further, the "relative paucity" of appellate case law
governing the waiver of counsel by juveniles is likely a
reflection of the absence of counsel to preserve the issue for
appeal in waiver cases as well as the general infrequency
with which juvenile appeals are brought.' 6
Thus, given the limited number of research studies in
this specific area, I"7 it is difficult-if not impossible-to
draw any definitive conclusions as to juveniles' perceptions
of fairness vis-A-vis the right to waive counsel in juvenile
court. Some of the unanswered questions include whether
young offenders are more or less likely to be given a voice
when they are represented by counsel, enabling them to
participate meaningfully in juvenile court proceedings;18
whether judges and prosecutors are more or less
sympathetic or empathetic to the unrepresented juvenile
than to the one with a contentious-or incompetent189 -
misunderstandings and distortions of the attorney-client relationship that are
likely to "interfere with their effective participation as defendants"); see also
Patricia Puritz & Katayoon Majd, Ensuring Authentic Youth Participation in
Delinquency Cases: Creating a Paradigm for Specialized Juvenile Defense
Practice, 45 FAM. CT. REV. 466 (2007) (urging juvenile defense attorneys to base
their arguments challenging children's waivers of rights on adolescent
development, "[g]iven the differential decisional capacity of youth").
186. Shepherd, supra note 166, at 40; see also N. Lee Cooper et al., supra note
178, at 674-75 (stating that the practice of taking appeals of juvenile
delinquency cases is lacking in most jurisdictions, and arguing that there are
strong arguments for pursuing appeals and for developing an "appeals
infrastructure"); Steven A. Drizin & Greg Luloff, Are Juvenile Courts A Breeding
Ground for Wrongful Convictions?, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 257, 294-99 (2007) (stating
that there is not an "active and zealous" appellate or post-conviction practice in
juvenile court); Barbara Fedders, Losing Hold of the Guiding Hand: Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel in Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. (forthcoming 2010) (discussing the paucity of ineffective assistance claims
in juvenile appeals); Puritz & Majd, supra note 185, at 466 (discussing the
barriers to effective defense representation in delinquency cases, the high stakes
of court involvement, and the fact that children affected by ineffective indigent
defense systems are disproportionately low-income children of color).
187. A rigorous search of social science databases found no studies focused on
juveniles' perceptions vis-A-vis the right to waive counsel.
188. See Schmidt et al., supra note 185, at 192 (finding that many juveniles
with prior experience in the criminal justice system maintain "a degree of
cynicism or distrust" of defense attorneys and, as a result, view the U.S.
indigent defense system negatively).
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attorney; and whether a juvenile's perceptions of the
fairness of the process are dependent upon having the
option to waive counsel and resolve the case pro se at the
first court hearing. Suffice it to say, more research is needed
in this area, which is arguably at the core of the juvenile
justice system.'9°
C. Schoolhouse Justice
Another area in which judges and law makers would
benefit from review and consideration of empirical data on
juveniles' perceptions of fairness and rates of reoffending is
that of the administration of justice within educational
institutions. There is a storied record of United States
Supreme Court opinions recognizing that a critical function
of the educational system is to instill, as stated in Brown v.
Board of Education, "the very foundation of good
citizenship" in its students.'9' The Court has characterized
teachers, administrators, and other school actors as serving
as role models for their students, "exerting a subtle but
important influence over their perceptions and values."'92
189. See Drizin & Luloff, supra note 186, at 289-92 ("[M]any juvenile
defendants are victims of ineffective assistance of counsel." [This can result from
factors such as] poor investigation, infrequent use of motions, high caseloads,
over-reliance on pleas, a juvenile court culture of wanting to 'help' juveniles, and
a general lack of training among attorneys on youth and adolescents.").
190. See Kristin Henning, Defining the Lawyer-Self: Using Therapeutic
Jurisprudence to Define the Lawyer's Role and Build Alliances that Aid the
Child Client, in THE AFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: PRACTICING LAW AS A
HEALNG PROFESSION 411, 425-26 (Marjorie A. Silver ed., 2007) (stating that the
right to direct and control counsel "falls at the center" of all other rights in the
juvenile justice system); Ellen Marrus, supra note 163, at 334 ("[T]he right to
representation by counsel is not a formality. It is not a grudging gesture to a
ritualistic requirement. It is of the essence of justice."' (quoting Kent v. United
States, 383 U.S. 541, 561 (1966))).
191. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); see also New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 373 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting)
("Schools are places where we inculcate the values essential to the meaningful
exercise of rights and responsibilities by a self-governing citizenry.'); Ambach v.
Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979) ("The importance of public schools in the
preparation of individuals for participation as citizens, and in the preservation
of the values on which our society rests, long has been recognized [by the
courts.]").
192. Ambach, 441 U.S. at 78-79 ('CThus, through both the presentation of
course materials and the example he [or she] sets, a teacher has an opportunity
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The Court has also acknowledged that a vital part of this
process involves respecting students' "fundamental rights,"
so as to ensure that students, in turn, learn "to respect their
obligations to the State."' 93
Much has changed in recent decades, however, and as
school actors increasingly serve side-by-side with or in lieu
of law enforcement,'94 a vicious cycle has been perpetuated:
when students are disciplined without meaningful process,
they inevitably view their treatment as having been unfair
and, as a result, are more likely to act out and reoffend
because they do not respect the authority of their teachers
and administrators. 195 In determining whether and to what
to influence the attitudes of students toward government, the political process,
and a citizen's social responsibilities.").
193. Tinker v. Des Moines Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) (stating
that if the school system does not respect students' "fundamental rights,"
students are unlikely to learn to "respect their obligations to the State"); see also
W. Va. State Bd of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) ("[Of the many
functions which school officials perform, there are] none that they may not
perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are educating the
young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional
freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at is source
and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere
platitudes.'). But see Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396-97 (2007) ("[S]chools
may take steps to safeguard those entrusted to their care from speech that can
reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use .... [T]he school officials
... did not violate the First Amendment by confiscating the pro-drug banner
and suspending the student responsible for it.').
194. See Josh Kagan, Reappraising T.L.O.'s "Special Needs" Doctrine in an
Era of School-Law Enforcement Entanglement, 33 J.L. & EDUc. 291, 291-92,
305-16 (2004) (discussing the extent to which schools and law enforcement have
become "increasingly entangled"); Michael Pinard, From the Classroom to the
Courtroom: Reassessing Fourth Amendment Standards in Public School
Searches Involving Law Enforcement Authorities, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 1067, 1069
(2003) ("[Ilncreasingly interdependent relationships between school officials and
law enforcement authorities, coupled with the proliferation of zero tolerance
policies in public schools, has led to the increased criminalization of youth
behavior.')
195. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 194, at 314-15 (suggesting that school
discipline policies perceived by students to be unfair ultimately prevent
rehabilitation and increase recidivism); see also Kristen Henning, Eroding
Confidentiality in Delinquency Proceedings: Should Schools and Public Housing
Authorities Be Notified?, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520, 524 (2004) ("[Slchool notification
statutes and school expulsion policies work together to inhibit rehabilitation and
actually increase crime over time.").
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degree school officials should be allowed to infringe upon
the privacy and due process rights of students, courts have
relied upon a subjective balancing test, whereby fairness to
the young person is weighed against the urgent need to
maintain school discipline."' Yet, few have asked whether
this is the most effective-or efficient-standard by which
to judge the procedures that we impose upon children and
adolescents in educational settings. How do students
themselves perceive the current framework for addressing
violations of disciplinary regulations and state criminal
statutes on school property? Are there fair and balanced
ways of addressing such infractions that would promote
both procedural justice and school safety? Which processes
and procedures are most likely to result in improved
student conduct, increased cooperation with teachers and
administrators, and greater academic success?
Establishing the historical legal context of these issues
provides a helpful frame for discussing their nuances. Until
the late 1960s, our public educational institutions punished
and disciplined students within the walls of their own
buildings without the involvement of law enforcement or
the courts, except in the most egregious and violent cases. 197
In 1975, the United States Supreme Court decided Goss v.
Lopez,'98 holding by a slim majority that notice and an
opportunity for "some kind of hearing" were required before
a school could suspend a student, even for fewer than ten
196. See, e.g., T.L.O. 469 U.S. at 341 & n.2 ("[Tihe accommodation of the
privacy interests of schoolchildren with the substantial need of teachers and
administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools does not require
strict adherence to the requirement that searches be based on probable cause to
believe that the subject of the search has violated or is violating the law.');
Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 155-57 (5th Cir. 1961) (utilizing a
balancing approach to hold that students at a public institution have a right to
notice and a specific statement of charges and grounds prior to expulsion). But
see Paul Holland, Schooling Miranda: Policing Interrogation in the Twenty-First
Century Schoolhouse, 52 Loy. L. REV. 39, 111 (2006) (arguing that the
assumption that applying Miranda to the school setting will compromise
discipline and safety is "natural but nevertheless ill-founded').
197. See Bernardine Dohrn, The School, the Child, and the Court, in A
CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 267, 280 (Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds.,
2002) (describing traditional school discipline policies, including classroom
reprimands, referrals to an administrator's office, corporal punishment,
suspension and expulsion).
198. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
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days. "' The right to counsel and the standard of "proof
beyond a reasonable doubt" were not extended to these
hearings, however,2" and the Goss dissenters warned that
even the modest requirement of a barebones hearing could
potentially undermine school discipline.2"' During the 1990s,
the era of the juvenile "super-predator"2" brought an
increase in the criminalization of adolescent behavior,2 °3
leading to more school-based arrests and resulting in
greater numbers of suspensions and expulsions.2° Many
199. Id. at 579.
200. Id. at 583.
201. Id. at 593 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("When an immature student merits
censure for his conduct, he is rendered a disservice if appropriate sanctions are
not applied or if procedures for their application are so formalized as to invite a
challenge to the teacher's authority-an invitation which rebellious or even
merely spirited teenagers are likely to accept."). Empirical data on whether
Goss's introduction of process into school disciplinary matters impacted
subsequent recidivism rates could be revealing, however, a search of social
science databases found no applicable studies.
202. John J. DiIulio Jr., The Coming of the Super-Predators, WEEKLY
STANDARD, Nov. 27, 1995, at 23 (coining the term "super-predators" to refer to
"severely morally-impoverished" juvenile "street criminals" who, Dilulio
claimed, were responsible for the "youth crime wave" and were raised in homes
"where unconditional love is nowhere but unmerciful abuse is common"); PETER
ELIKANN, SUPERPREDATORS: THE DEMONIZATION OF OUR CHILDREN BY THE LAW 41-
42, 66 (1999); Joyce Purnick, Youth Crime: Should Laws Be Tougher?, N.Y.
TIMES, May 9, 1996, at B1 (quoting prosecutor as characterizing juvenile
delinquents as "superpredators").
203. See OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME 59-
61 (July 1996), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/statresp.pdf (finding
that as a result of the perception that juvenile crime was on the rise, the
majority of states changed their laws during the early 1990s, resulting in a
generally more punitive juvenile justice system). But see MIKE A. MALES,
FRAMING YOUTH: TEN MYTHS ABOUT THE NEXT GENERATION 32 (1999) (discussing
the media's mischaracterization of youth violence during the 1990s as "soaring,"
when it was actually falling); Julian V. Roberts, Public Opinion and Youth
Justice, 31 CRIME & JUST. 495, 499-503 (2004) (finding that empirical research
has shown that people overestimated the volume of crime for which juveniles
were responsible); J. Robert Flores, Foreword to HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA
SICKMUND, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VIcTIMS: 2006
NATIONAL REPORT iii (2006), http://ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/nr2006/downloads/
NR2006.pdf (finding that the rate of juvenile violent crime arrests has decreased
steadily since 1994, falling to a level "not seen since at least the 1970s").
204. Dohrn, supra note 197, at 282 (describing the skyrocketing of school
expulsions as states added drug possession and assaults on school personnel as
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schools, particularly in urban and low-income areas, became
more prison-like, with an increased police presence and
more institutional personnel dedicated to maintaining
security. 5 Such circumstances were further exacerbated by
the relaxation of rules governing the confidentiality of
juvenile court records0 6 and the proliferation of zero
tolerance policies," 7 allowing schools to become "direct
feeders" of youth into juvenile and adult criminal courts.2 8
A review of social science research on the perceptions of
children and teenagers vis-A-vis their rights in the school
setting reveals that the data is compelling but incomplete.209
bases for disciplinary proceedings); Pinard, supra note 194, at 1096-97, 1104-05
(discussing the "interdependency and interconnectedness" between school
officials and law enforcement that has "in many ways melded the criminal
justice system with school disciplinary processes"); see also Gun-Free Schools
Act § 4141, 20 U.S.C. § 7151 (2006) (excluding guns from schools and mandating
a one-year expulsion for possession of a firearm on school property); Joan M.
Wasser, Note, Zeroing in on Zero Tolerance, 15 J.L. & POL. 747, 749-50 (1999)
(stating that many states expanded the definition of "weapon" to allow them to
expel students "caught even once" for carrying even common implements such
as knives or low-tech fireworks).
205. See Dohrn, supra note 197, at 282-83. But see Holland, supra note 196, at
40 (cautioning against speaking too generally about the role of police in schools,
as there are still many districts in which administrators retain a traditional
tutelary role).
206. See Henning, supra note 195, 577-88 (examining how schools and public
housing authorities obtain juvenile records and use them to exclude children
and their families from the benefits of education and housing, reevaluating
assumptions about adolescents' amenability to treatment, and concluding that
public housing authorities should be denied access to juvenile records while
schools should have limited access on a case-by-case basis in order to
accommodate both school safety and rehabilitation); Kagan, supra note 194, at
313.
207. Pinard, supra note 194, at 1069, 1109-11 ("Critics assert that while zero
tolerance policies were originally aimed to rid schools of dangerous weapons,
they have reached past their intended purpose to criminalize student behavior
which poses no threat to physical well-being or safety.").
208. Dohrn, supra note 197, at 283; Holland, supra note 196, at 74 ("The
National Assocciation of School Resource Officers ... claim[s] that school-based
policing is 'the fastest growing area of law enforcement."' (citation omitted)); see
also Pinard, supra note 194, at 1069, 1105-07 (discussing the debate over
whether increased placement of law enforcement officers in schools engenders
"greater trust and understanding between children and . . . authorities" or
whether it is "a drastic step that could lead to various abuses').
209. See infra notes 210-12 and accompanying text.
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Studies abound that illustrate that students of color are
disproportionately punished in United States schools and
subjected to the most punitive sanctions, including
suspensions and expulsions."' There are also studies that
indicate that because American schools increasingly define
and manage the problem of student misbehavior through
the perspective of crime control, students who are
repeatedly disciplined begin to view themselves as future
criminals or prisoners on the "criminal justice 'track."' 21'
Such studies recognize that anticipatory labeling of
students as prospective criminals can be a self-fulfilling
prophesy, as research shows that frequently suspended
students are more likely to face juvenile or adult
210. See, e.g., Building Blocks for Youth, Fact Sheet: Zero Tolerance,
http://www.buildingblocksforyouth.org/issues/zerotolerance/facts.html (stating
that statistics from 1998-2000 show that children of color are subjected to
higher rates of suspensions and expulsions than white children); Kagan, supra
note 194, at 323 (reporting that schools with higher minority populations are
more likely to have a significant police presence, leading to more frequent
searches, and that interactions between police and students "disproportionately
burden" African-American and Latino youth); Susan Sandler et al., Turning to
Each Other, Not on Each Other: How School Communities Prevent Racism in
School Discipline 5 (Esther Morales ed., 2000), available at
http://www.justicematters.org/jmisec/jmi.dwnlds/turning.pdf (finding, based on
U.S. Deptartment of Education statistics, that African-American students are
suspended at twice their percentage in the national student population); see also
MIKE MALES & DAN MACALLAIR, THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: AN ANALYSIS OF
JUVENILE ADULT COURT TRANSFERS IN CALIFORNIA 4 (2000) (finding that minority
youth are disproportionately referred to the juvenile justice system and, once
there, receive the most punitive sanctions as compared to white youth); Pinard,
supra note 194, at 1115-16 (stating that commentators have attributed
discrepancies between the treatment of white students and students of color to
cultural differences in communication styles between students of color and
school administrators and to the fact that zero tolerance policies are more
prevalent in schools that have majority populations of students of color).
211. Paul J. Hirschfeld, Preparing for Prison? The Criminalization of School
Discipline in the USA, 12 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 79, 79, 91 (2008); see also
Russell Skiba et al., Consistent Removal: Contributions of School Discipline to
the School-Prison Pipeline 4 (School to Prison Pipeline Conference, Harvard
Civil Rights Project 2003), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu1
researchlpipelineO3/Skibbav3.pdf (finding that schools with an increased police
presence and zero tolerance policies have higher rates of juvenile delinquency
and incarceration, and suggesting that such policies increase the likelihood that
affected students will recidivate).
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incarceration."' More research, however, is needed,
particularly that which explores the impact of specific
procedures and practices utilized by school administrators
and law enforcement on students' perceptions of fairness.
D. Home Rule
A final area in which courts, lawmakers, and even
parents would benefit from greater knowledge and
appreciation of social psychology concerns the role of the
parent"3 in the juvenile justice system. Consistent with
social science studies relevant to other areas impacting
juveniles, the applicable data demonstrates that if a child or
adolescent considers disciplinary measures within the home
to be unfair, a pattern of behavior similar to that seen in
other contexts will ensue: lack of respect for the authority
figure, disengagement from the disciplinary structure,
cynicism towards the system, and subsequent and
continued rule-breaking.2  Research has shown that
children typically perceive family decision making to be
unfair when parents deny them the opportunity to express
their views; when procedures are perceived to be
inconsistent across situations or family members; and when
parents are considered to be biased, underhanded, or
dishonest. 5 Additional fairness concerns stem from the
child's perception that the parent's decision-making process
is based on unreliable information, or the parent does not
212. Hirschfeld, supra note 211, at 92 (citing Richard Arum & Irenee R.
Beattie, High School Experience and the Risk of Adult Incarceration, 37
CRIMINOLOGY 515 (1999)).
213. The term "parent" as used here is intended to refer to the adult who
serves in the role of parent, guardian, or custodian to the juvenile, whether that
individual is a biological or adopted parent, sibling, grandparent, family friend,
etc.
214. See, e.g., Mark Fondacaro et al., Procedural Justice in Resolving Family
Disputes: A Psychosocial Analysis of Individual and Family Functioning in Late
Adolescence, 27 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 101, 101-19 (1998); Jackson &
Fondacaro, supra note 27, at 101, 118-119, 121; Jennifer Stuart et al.,
Procedural Justice in Family Conflict Resolution and Deviant Peer Group
Involvement Among Adolescents: The Mediating Influence of Peer Conflict, 37 J.
YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 674, 674-84 (2008); see also Jackson & Fondacaro, supra
note 27, at 106 (discussing findings that parenting styles that reflect procedural
justice constructs appear to be related to children's improved behavior and
positive psychological adjustment).
215. Fondacaro et al., supra note 214, at 102, 114-15.
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consider the child to be a valued member of the family." 6 As
seen in other areas, the empirical research demonstrates
that adolescents care deeply about being treated with
dignity and respect and having their voices heard during
the family's decision making process, regardless of whether
it affects the ultimate outcome.217 Studies have also shown
that children who perceive their parents' disciplinary
practices to be fair are more likely to internalize their
family's values and beliefs. 18 While extrapolations from
such extralegal research may be made, unfortunately there
is very little data specifically focused on how young
offenders view the role typically assumed by adult family
members in juvenile court,21 9 that of the party to whom
judges and probation officers frequently defer and whom
they resist evaluating critically.22 °
The role of the parent in a juvenile case has been closely
analyzed in legal literature, and the consensus is that it is
fraught with tension and inherent contradictions. 22' Most
obviously, it is clear that from a therapeutic perspective, the
"participatory and dignitary interests" of an accused child
are highly likely to conflict with those of the child's parent
in juvenile court.222 This is certainly the case when, as
happens frequently, the parent is the alleged victim of the
offense for which the juvenile is charged or has a
relationship-familial, sexual, or otherwise--with either the
216. Id. at 103, 114-15 (citing Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Models of the
Justice Motive: Antecedents of Distributive and Procedural Justice, 67 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 850, 850-63. (1994)).
217. Id. (citing studies by Tyler and Lind, among others).
218. Id. at 106 (citing Tom R. Tyler & Peter Degoey, Community, Family, and
the Social Good: The Psychological Dynamics of Procedural Justice and Social
Identification, in THE INDIVIDUAL, THE FAMILY, AND SOCIAL GOOD: PERSONAL
FULFILLMENT IN TIMES OF CHANGE (G.B. Melton ed., 1995)).
219. A thorough search of social science databases found no research on the
question of how young offenders view the role of parents in juvenile court.
220. See Janet R. Fink, Who Decides: The Role of Parent or Guardian in
Juvenile Delinquency Representation, in ETHICAL PROBLEMS FACING THE
CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER 119, 124-25 (Rodney J. Uphoff ed., 1995).
221. See, e.g., Kristin Henning, It Takes a Lawyer to Raise a Child?:
Allocating Responsibilities Among Parents, Children, and Lawyers in
Delinquency Cases, 6 NEV. L.J. 836, 849-52 (2006); see also infra notes 222-31
and accompanying text.
222. Henning, supra note 190, at 424.
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alleged victim or another suspect in the investigation;223 the
parent is repeatedly provided the opportunity to
communicate directly with the judge, prosecutor, or
probation officer, while the juvenile is allowed only to speak
through her attorney;224 and the juvenile's attorney takes
direction from the parent rather than the child as to the
goals and objectives of the juvenile's case.225 Yet, admittedly,
there are also instances in which the parent acts as the
stooge for the juvenile, diverting responsibility for the
child's crime to herself, covering for the child's negative
behavior at home or at school, and interfering with or
sabotaging candid communication between the juvenile and
her lawyer in the name of "protecting" the child.
27
Further complicating matters is the reality that long-
term damage to the parent-child relationship can result
from both the process and the ultimate resolution of a
juvenile delinquency proceeding. Excluding parents from
the attorney-client dynamic, which is caused inadvertently
as well as deliberately by defense counsel, can lead parents
to disengage from their supportive roles altogether, leaving
the parent-child bond more fractured than it had been
before the family's involvement with the juvenile justice
system. 22' Likewise, frustrated or put-upon parents may
223. Hillary B. Farber, The Role of the Parent/Guardian in Juvenile
Custodial Interrogations: Friend or Foe?, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1277, 1293-94
(2004).
224. Henning, supra note 190, at 424.
225. Fink, supra note 220, at 122-23; Henning, supra note 190, at 424.
226. See HERTZ ET AL., supra note 166, at 696 (suggesting that counsel for the
juvenile inform the parent in preparation for disposition of the "harm" that can
result from revealing their child's "criminal activities, drug or alcohol use,
serious misbehavior at home, or other bad conduct" to the probation officer or
prosecutor).
227. See Farber, supra note 223, at 1307 ("When a child is suspected of a
crime, his [or her] parent may demonstrate a range of emotions, such as fear,
anger or protectiveness."); Henning, supra note 221, at 854; HERTZ ET AL., supra
note 166, at 136 (discussing the potential difficulties that defense counsel may
confront when explaining the need for a private interview with the juvenile to
her parent, and noting that the attorney's insistence that the parent's presence
may bias the interview could "produce nothing but ill will and intransigence on
the parent's part).
228. See Farber, supra note 223, at 1305 ("I recognize that the appointment of
counsel for the juvenile, by inserting a third party into the parent-child decision-
making process, may have a significant impact on the integrity of the family
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insist that their rights and authority over their children are
a form of compensation for the burdens of providing basic
food, shelter, health care, affection, and education to their
delinquent children, further splintering critical alliances.229
Similarly, parents may place blame wholly upon the child
for alleged violations of juvenile court probation or post-
release supervision23 ° out of a reasonable fear that they may
face criminal charges for contempt of court or other punitive
sanctions. 3 Whatever the case, the circumstances are
complex and the effects potentially profound.
Thus, while there is a fair amount of social science
research exploring the perceptions that adolescents have of
their parents as disciplinarians within the home
environment,232 further studies examining how juveniles
perceive the role of the parent in the context of delinquency
court-both in theory and practice-are clearly warranted.
Similarly, research on whether juveniles' attitudes and
receptivity toward the court are predetermined by their
judgments of disciplinary measures at home could be
fruitful.233 Judges and law makers would be better equipped
to outline the parameters of the parental role in juvenile
court if they were informed by, among other factors, the
unit."); Bruce C. Hafen & Jonathan 0. Hafen, Abandoning Children to Their
Autonomy: The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 37 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 449, 483-84 (1996).
229. Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 547, 551 (2000) ("In some sense it is fair to view parental 'rights' as legal
compensation for the burden of responsibility that the law imposes on
parents.').
230. See HERTZ ET AL., supra note 166, at 728-29 (recommending that defense
counsel prepare for the revocation hearing by, inter alia, talking with the parent
to determine whether any of the bases for revocation may be explained and
whether responsibility for the violation may be shifted from the juvenile to the
probation officer or parent).
231. Henning, supra note 221, at 858-60; see, e.g. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2706
(2004) (stating that upon motion by the juvenile probation officer, prosecutor or
upon the court's own motion, the court may issue an order directing the parent
or guardian to appear and show cause why they should not be found or held in
civil or criminal contempt for willfully failing to comply with an order of the
court).
232. See supra notes 214-31 and accompanying text.




child's perspective on these issues as seen through the lens
of procedural justice theory.
IV. CAVEATS AND QUESTIONS FOR MOVING AHEAD
A. Which Model to Use?
While sociologists have long recognized the importance
of juveniles' believing that they have received procedural
justice from the courts, this Article has demonstrated that
the answer is not merely to superimpose adult due process
standards onto delinquency proceedings, but it is something
much more nuanced and challenging.234 There is first the
difficult question of whether an adversarial or an
inquisitorial model (or a hybrid of the two) would be more
conducive to achieving an equitable juvenile justice
system.235 Complicating this question, at least in terms of
juvenile court systems in the United States, is the reality
that an evidence-based determination of whether a juvenile
committed an alleged offense is often a prerequisite to the
state's providing a low-income family with rehabilitative
and therapeutic services. While this does not mandate that
juvenile court forever be modeled on an adversarial criminal
justice system, addressing and separating out all the
strands of the problem would require law makers and public
policy experts to critically rethink and potentially
restructure the current juvenile court model.
Further, juveniles adjudicated delinquent (as well as
their parents) often consider services provided by the
court-which are of varying quality and utility-to be
burdens rather than benefits;... this view is compounded by
234. See supra notes 148-232 and accompanying text.
235. Cordon et al., supra note 146, at 180-89 (discussing the differences
between the two procedural systems in the context of adult criminal court); see
also Fondacaro et al., supra note 27, at 981-83 (discussing studies that have
compared the abilities of the adversarial and inquisitorial systems to reduce
bias and increase accuracy, and suggesting that inquisitorial procedures may
result in more accurate and less biased information than the adversarial
process).
236. See HERTZ ET AL., supra note 166, at 716 (stating that the more
probationary conditions that are imposed at disposition, the greater the risk




the knowledge that if the juvenile missteps, the punishment
is likely an extension of the term of probation, detention, or
commitment.237 As discussed previously, social science
research has suggested that such deterrent structures are
both less effective and less efficient than systems perceived
by children and adolescents to be fair and unbiased.238
Again, resolving this question would require that law
makers and juvenile justice advocates closely consider
whether granting specific due process protections to
juveniles would advance the goals of procedural justice
theory.
There is also the critical question of how far-and in
precisely which direction-to go. While there is a well-
established movement devoted to applying the theory of
therapeutic jurisprudence ("TJ") to juvenile court practice,239
legal scholars and social psychologists should distinguish
and differentiate between TJ and procedural justice theory,
both in the spirit of clarity and to avoid counter-productive
"border disputes."2" According to the work of leading
scholars in these areas, TJ is a discipline that examines the
"therapeutic impact of the law on the various participants
involved[,J" with the goal of promoting well-being.241 In the
context of criminal defense practice, TJ emphasizes the
importance of lawyers considering rehabilitative efforts on
behalf of their clients and provides lawyers with practice
237. Id. at 726-29 (explaining that if a juvenile violates a condition of
probation, any disposition that was available at the original dispositional
hearing is possible at a revocation hearing, including an extension of probation
or incarceration or even a new sentence of incarceration).
238. See supra notes 107-12 and accompanying text.
239. See Christopher Slobogin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Five Dilemmas to
Ponder, in LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY 763, 763 (David B. Wexler & Bruce J.
Winick eds., 1996) (stating that the therapeutic jurisprudence movement is no
longer "fledging," and that the number of scholars who view the law through its
lens has "grown appreciably" since David Wexler and Bruce Winick introduced
the idea in the early 1990s).
240. See Jeffrey Fagan, Juvenile Crime and Criminal Justice: Resolving
Border Disputes, 18 THE FUTURE OF CHILD., Fall 2008, at 81, 90-91 ("[The
punitive and child-saver instincts for youth crime co-exist uneasily in the
current statutory environment, forcing a binary choice between criminal and
juvenile court jurisdiction, a choice that is not well suited to reconcile these
tensions.").
241. Shiff & Wexler, supra note 126, at 291.
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tips on how to guide their clients along "a promising
rehabilitative path."'242 In regard to the juvenile justice
system, TJ was developed to counter the paternalistic
ideology of the traditional delinquency court243 and to
encourage and facilitate the child's sense of individual
autonomy, self-determination, and choice.2" Procedural
justice theory is more of a touchstone or a guide that is
focused on achieving legal processes that juveniles perceive
as legitimate, premised on the recognition that when a child
feels that the system has treated her fairly, she is more
likely to accept responsibility for her actions and take steps
towards reform. 245
Yet, there is more overlap between these two theories
than contrast or tension. Suffice it to say that this Article's
focus has been on juveniles' perceptions of fairness as they
relate to the juvenile justice system as a whole and as
determined by an examination of a well-developed body of
data, rather than on models of advocacy or the therapeutic
consequences of legal rules and procedures.4 Yet, the two
disciplines of course are interconnected, as the quality (or
lack thereof) of the attorney-client relationship inevitably
influences whether the juvenile is impacted in a therapeutic
242. David B. Wexler, The TJ Criminal Lawyer: Therapeutic Jurisprudence
and Criminal Law Practice, in THE AFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 367, 376
(Marjorie A. Silver ed., 2007).
243. See Henning, supra note 190, at 414-15 (stating that paternalism is
"anti-therapeutic because it breeds apathy, hinders motivation, and limits the
potential for rehabilitation"); see also Ronner, supra note 28, at 112 (describing
therapeutic jurisprudence as an approach in which lawyers engage their
juvenile clients in their own treatment plans, as compliance rates increase with
such collaboration).
244. Henning, supra note 190, at 414-15; Ronner, supra note 28, at 114
(quoting In re Amendment to Rules of Juvenile Procedure, 804 So. 2d 1206,
1210-11 (Fla. 2001) ("[Tjhe dependent child's perception as to whether.., she is
being listened to and whether ... her opinion is respected and counted is
integral to the child's behavioral and psychological progress.")); see also Georgia
Zara, Therapeutic Jurisprudence as an Integrative Approach to Understanding
the Socio-Psychological Reality of Young Offenders, 71 U. CIN. L. REv. 127 (2002)
(suggesting, from the perspective of therapeutic jurisprudence, that the
undesired behavior of adolescents may be corrected once the child identifies
personal goals and gains confidence in her ability to achieve them).
245. TYLER, supra note 101, at 37.
246. Slobogin, supra note 239, at 767 (stating that procedural justice theory
tests assumptions of the law, while TJ offers a normative stance on the law).
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manner, which in turn affects the child's perceptions of the
adjudicatory process itself.247 Likewise, adherents of both TJ
and procedural justice theory rely on empirical research by
behavioral scientists, striving to "avoid a narrow doctrinal
focus ... and [to] influence legislators and administrators
as well as the courts.""24 In this way, both disciplines are
"truly interdisciplinary."249 So, while this Article's focus has
not been upon client-centered juvenile defense advocacy or
children's mental health per se, its arguments rely upon the
recognition that these values and goals are of great
significance to determining whether a child feels that her
experience was fair.25° Or, in other words, the enterprise of
therapeutic jurisprudence is an important aspect-though
just one aspect-of ensuring that juveniles receive
procedural justice."'
B. Shortcomings and Limitations
As with any body of social science research, particularly
that which attempts to draw a causal connection between
abstract human perceptions (i.e., fairness and legitimacy)
and subsequent compliance with authority, there are
inherent limitations regardless of whether the analysis is
centered on adults or adolescents. A basic one is that there
have been very few longitudinal studies on procedural
247. Henning, supra note 190, at 415-16 ("By facilitating the child's choice
and self-determination in the disposition phase of a juvenile case, the system
can enhance the child's motivation and increase the efficacy of treatment in
which the child chooses or agrees to participate.').
248. Slobogin, supra note 239, at 764.
249. Id. (quoting David B. Wexler, New Directions in Therapeutic
Jurisprudence: Breaking the Bounds of Conventional Mental Health Law
Scholarship, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. Hum. RTs. 759, 761 (1993)).
250. See Ronner, supra note 28, at 95 ("In the juvenile context, the attorney is
key-it is he or she who can help the juvenile articulate his or her wishes and,
thus, have a voice and obtain validation.'). But see Feld, supra note 177, at 228-
30.
251. See Mae C. Quinn, An RSVP to Professor Wexler's Warm Therapeutic
Jurisprudence Invitation to the Criminal Defense Bar: Unable to Join You,
Already (Somewhat Similarly) Engaged, 48 B.C. L. REV. 539, 562-90 (2007)
(arguing against the application of some therapeutic jurisprudence approaches
to criminal defense practice on the ground that they are based upon faulty
assumptions and present legal and ethical quandaries for the defense attorney).
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justice theory.252 While it has been shown that ex ante
assessments of the fairness of a decision-making process can
be very different than ex post,253 the relevance of this
phenomenon to procedural justice theory remains an open
question." Another limitation stems from the fact that the
focus of much procedural justice research is upon political
power and authority rather than upon law-abiding
behavior.255 In other words, most studies seek to mine the
perceptions of the law held by individuals within the
general population rather than those of individuals already
actively engaged in criminal behavior.256 This can be a
critical drawback, as offenders have more experiences
within the system and presumably more and various kinds
of outcomes than do non-offenders.257 Yet, studies have
found consistent procedural justice effects across race,
gender, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status.258 In addition,
studies specifically examining the impact of procedural
justice on juvenile offenders have indeed been conducted;
the hope is that with renewed interest in this data, more
research will be funded and the sample sizes expanded,
thereby enhancing the reliability of the results.259
A further limitation is the narrow focus of procedural
justice theory on the ways in which an individual's
252. But see Kristina Murphy & Tom Tyler, Procedural Justice and
Compliance Behaviour: The Mediating Role of Emotions, 38 EuR. J. Soc.
PSYCHOL. 652, 662-65 (2008) (finding, based on longitudinal study data, that
one's emotional reaction-whether positive or negative-to perceived justice or
injustice predicts who will or will not ultimately comply with authority,
meaning that those with greater perceptions of procedural injustice are more
likely to be "less satisfied, less productive, and less compliant').
253. MacCoun, supra note 97, at 192-93.
254. Id. at 193.
255. Papachristos et al., supra note 88, at 5.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 5-7.
258. O'Hear, supra note 28, at 462 & n.224 (citing Tom Tyler & E. Allen Lind,
Procedural Justice, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAw 65, 65 (Joseph
Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2001) and quoting Robert J. MacCoun, supra
note 97, at 187 ("Mlost studies have found striking similarities across
demographic groups in the antecedents and consequences of procedural fairness
.... ')).
259. But see supra notes 127-32 and accompanying text (discussing studies on
procedural justice and juveniles that have focused on offenders).
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perceptions are influenced by her own experiences and
interactions rather than upon the impact and effect of her
peer group, neighborhood, and extended social network.2"
Such factors are potentially significant because a major
predictor of delinquent behavior by juveniles is the number
and quality of their mentors and peers.26 Studies in this
area generally utilize interviews conducted with or surveys
completed by individual juveniles in which the questions
are designed to assess the youth's feelings regarding her
treatment by the defense lawyer, prosecutor, and judge;
questions are also posed that are intended to determine the
degree to which the young person feels the law and the
courts are legitimate.2" As a result, such methods that focus
on the individual's level of confidence either in her lawyer or
in the system, without assessing the impact of peers or
other external forces on the juvenile's perceptions, may have
limited efficacy.263
In addition to these methodological limitations, there
are critics of procedural justice theory who have raised
questions directed more squarely at the discipline's most
basic assumptions." For instance, it has been asserted that
when people experience a process to be fair, they can be led
or manipulated into ignoring objectively unfair outcomes,265
particularly if the majority of outcomes experienced by a
260. Papachristos et al., supra note 88, at 6.
261. Id. (citing MARK WARR, COMPANIONS IN CRIME: THE SOCIAL ASPECTS OF
CRIMINAL CONDUCT (2002)); see also Carrie F. Mulford & Richard E. Redding,
Training the Parents of Juvenile Offenders: State of the Art and
Recommendations for Service Delivery, 17 J. CHILD. FAM. STUD. 629, 631 (2008)
(discussing a social development approach that is "based on the notion that
youth who are attached to 'prosocial' peers, parents and others are less likely to
engage in delinquent acts").
262. See, e.g., Sprott & Greene, supra note 130, at 7-11.
263. Id. Likewise, research exploring whether juveniles' perceptions of the
fairness of disciplinary measures within social structures such as gangs and
other peer groups impact their judgments of the procedural fairness of courts
could be revealing; a search of social science databases, however, found no such
studies.
264. See infra notes 265-69 and accompanying text.
265. MacCoun, supra note 97, at 188-89; see also Ronald L. Cohen, Procedural
Justice and Participation, 7 HuM. REL. 643, 658-61 (1985) (finding that in
employment settings, limited participation in decision-making leads people to
consider the process as less just than if they had not participated at all).
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given group have been consistently negative.266 So, for
instance, a narrow focus on the importance of providingjuvenile offenders with the opportunity to have a "voice"
may obscure a more global need to give them meaningful
control over judicial decisions.267 Proponents of this concept
of "false consciousness" argue that a preoccupation with due
process diverts attention from broader questions of social
inequality.26 Other critics have suggested that proceduraljustice has more legitimacy for adults than juveniles based
on developmental status and competence; these
commentators view juveniles as incapable of appreciating
"fairness" in a way that is normatively reliable.269
In sum, while there are clear limitations to the utility of
applying procedural justice theory to juveniles, and while
there are open questions regarding which procedural model
to use for delinquency court, these should be considered as
cautions rather than roadblocks. In other words, rather
than restrict ourselves to suppositions based on abstract
notions of fairness and subjective balancing or on
unyielding quid pro quo calculations, why not make use of
266. MacCoun, supra note 97, at 192. See generally John T. Jost et al., A
Decade of System Justification Theory: Accumulated Evidence of Conscious and
Unconscious Bolstering of the Status Quo, 25 POL. PSYCHOL. 881 (2004)
(reviewing and integrating research focusing on the phenomenon of "outgroup
favoritism," in which people purport to approve of outcomes that benefit groups
to which they do not belong because it is preferable to acknowledging that the
system itself is flawed).
267. MacCoun, supra note 97, at 192-93; see also E. Allen Lind, Ruth Kanfer
& P. Christopher Earley, Voice, Control, and Procedural Justice: Instrumental
and Noninstrumental Concerns in Fairness Judgments, 59 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 952, 957-58 (1990) (finding that giving participants a "post-
decisional" or purely symbolic voice in the decision-making process is just as
important a benefit as giving them a predecisional voice that can actually affect
the outcome).
268. See MacCoun, supra note 97, at 189. But see id. at 199 (discussing critics
of "false consciousness" who have characterized this view as "politically elitist
and epistemologically naive").
269. But see P.S. Fry & V.K. Corfield, Children's Judgments of Authority
Figures with Respect to Outcome and Procedural Fairness, 143 J. GEN. PSYCHOL.
241 (1983) (suggesting that procedural justice effects are valid for children); see
also ELEANOR E. MACCOBY, SocIAL DEVELOPMENT: PSYCHOLOGICAL GROWTH AND
THE PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP 307-08 (Jerome Kagan ed., 1980) (discussing
the development of children's sense of fairness and finding higher-level fairness
assessments as early as age eight).
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the empirical data being produced by experts in the social
sciences? Why not be open to an interdisciplinary and
multilayered analysis of whether to extend specific due
process rights to juveniles, rather than one that is cabined
by the same traditional approaches that have been used for
decades by courts and legislatures? Regardless of one's
perspective, all sides-judges, prosecutors, defense
attorneys, victims, and juveniles themselves-stand to
benefit.
CONCLUSION
Courts and legislatures have long been reluctant to
make use of the data, findings, and recommendations
generated by other disciplines when determining questions
of legal procedure affecting juveniles, particularly when the
research has been produced by social scientists.270 However,
given the United States Supreme Court's recent invocation
of developmental psychology in Roper v. Simmons,27 ' which
invalidated the juvenile death penalty,2" there is reason to
believe that such resistance is waning. In 2005 the
Simmons Court found, inter alia, that based on research on
adolescent development, "juveniles are not as culpable as
adults and[, therefore], cannot be classified among the
'worst offenders,' deserving of' the ultimate penalty. " In
the 2009-10 Term, the Court will take up the arguably
related question of the constitutionality of life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders,274
making it likely that social psychology will play a role yet
again in a Supreme Court decision.275
Such developments may be viewed as paving the way
for judges and law makers to utilize empirical research
270. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text; see also Bibas &
Bierschbach, supra note 28, at 111-12.
271. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
272. Id. at 567-75.
273. Birckhead, supra note 145, at 389-91.
274. Adam Liptak, Justices Agree to Take Up Life-Without-Parole Sentences
for Young Offenders, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2009, at A16.
275. Id. (quoting sentencing expert Doug Berman, who said, "The principals
driving Roper would seem to suggest that its impact does not stop at the
execution chamber').
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more consistently when determining whether due process
rights should be extended to juveniles. By evaluating
adolescents' appraisals of the fairness of courts and the law,
social scientists have generated potentially invaluable data
relating to recidivism rates and, thus, to the safety of our
neighborhoods and communities. While research in these
areas is incomplete and has its inherent limitations, that
which exists can serve as yet another factor to inform
decisions regarding jury trials, waiver of counsel, the school
disciplinary process, and the role of the parent in juvenile
court. It is not a stretch to suggest that children and
adolescents would view the opportunity to have more
information rather than less when crafting important
juvenile court procedures to be the preferable-and fairer-
choice.

